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Cert to CA 1 ~ ~,., ~ ~ 
(Coffin, Aldrich, McEntee)  ¥--
WILBUR Federal Civil (Habeas) Timely ~ ' 
The State of Maine seeks review of a CA 1 decision affirming 
a decision by USDC (Gignoux) granting a writ of habeas corpus. 
Respondent's murder conviction was vacated because the federal 
-- -- --
courts viewed Maine's "presumption of malice" in "felonious 
,-----......_ - - ---- - - . • 
homicide" cases to be a violation of due process under Winship. 
FACTS: Respondent was convicted of the murder of Claude Hebert. 




injuries upon Hebert (which caused his death), but claimed he 
had killed in the heat of passion sudd~nly provoked by Hebert's 
homosexual advances; respondent did not testify at trial. The 
court instructed the jury: 
"In all cases where the unlawful killing is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, ana "wnere mere is notfilng in the circum-
stances of the case to explain, qualify, or palliate the 
action, the~ r ~ i .t_.__!:~_!l_ave beell_~O.!_l e ~i_th malice 
a~g_h...t_. Ana if the accused, t at is the defendant, 
would reduce the crime below the degree of murder, the 
burden is upon him to rebut the inference which the law 
raises from the act of killing, by evidence in defense." 
It is again, [sic, not?] I must say, that he must call 
witnesses to the stand in defense. But it means that from 
all the evidence in the case he must be able to satisfy you 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that .•• although 
he killed, and although he killed unlawfully, if such is the 
case, he killed in . the heat of passion upon sudden provocation, 
as I shall explain hereafter. And if such were your findings, 
then the respondent, the defendant, would be . • • guilty of 
manslaughter and not murder. [473 F.2d 943, 944] 
Although respondent did not object to the charge at trial, on -----
dir_~ct appeal the Supreme Judicial Co1::.:.:._~f Maine considered 
his challenge to the malice presumption. Since respondent was ----- - --
tried in 1966, the court declined to anticipate that Winship 
. 1/ 
would be held retroactive.- More fundamentally, the court 
concluded that Winship did not govern the presumption of malice. 
Although separate Maine statutes have defined murder and man-
slaughter since the inception of its statehood, the court looked 
to early Maine decisions that had spoken of murder and manslaughter 
as "degrees" within the crime of "felonious homicide." State v. 
Conley, 39 Me. 78 (1854). Under this ·theory, malice was not an 
essential element of the crime of "felonious homicide" but rather 
a factor that went to the level of punishment (as murder or man-
1/ The Maine court was incorrect in its prophecy. Ivan V. v. 
City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972). 
~; 
//. .\ ~' ,, 
- 3 -
slaughter). The Maine court added that the presumption rested 
upon sound public policy since it would be quite difficult as 
a practical matter for the state to negate a "suggestion" of 
sudden provocation and heat of passion beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 278 A.2d 139. 
Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
USDC. Reading the murder and manslaughter statutes separately, 
USDC concluded that they defined two separate and distinct crimes. 
Since malice aforethought is the element distinguishing murder ------ --- __ ________,__ -- -from manslaughter, malice is undeniably an essential element of - ------- - - --------
the crime of murder, and Winship requires that it be proved by 
- --------------- --- --- -- -the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The court vacated 
- ----- -- ----- - ~ the conviction and sentence. 349 F.Supp. 154. On appeal, CA 1 
accused the Maine court of linguistic gymnastics, questioning 
the ,. integrity of the sudden "new interpretation" of the murder 
and manslaughter statutes. CA 1 found the state court's analysis 
"unacceptable". Although it noted that other jurisdictions per-
mit the jury to infer malice aforethought f r om the evidence pre-
sented, it found Maine's presumption of malice violative of 
Winship. 473 F.2d at 947-48; see also 349 F.Supp at 153, n.4. 
In a final observation, the panel expressed doubt that "a 
formula which imposed on the defendant a factual issue deter-
minative of the length of sentence would be any more acceptable 
than when used to establish an element of the crime." 473 F.2d 
at 948. 
The state sought certiorari. While its petition was pending, 




State v. Lafferty, 309 A.Zd 647 (1973), the court angrily pointed 
-----------
out that "a Federal court has no right to reject the rational 
interpretations given a state law under those circumstances by 
"-- ........ ........_ -- - -- -..... 
the highest appellate court of that state." 309 A.Zd at 662 
[emphasis in original]. The court reaffirmed its interpretation 
/ ~ of murder and manslaughter as •~ of "felonious homicide" 
and rejected the suggestion that Winship requires the state to 
negate beyond a reasonable doubt "all mitigating circumstances" 
,,. 
going (not to guilt or innocent) to punishment. The state 
the Lafferty decision to the attention of this Court which then 
granted cert:torari, m ated the decision of CA 1, and remanded 
----------
the case for further consideration in light of Lafferty. 414 
- - -- -- - ----- --u. s. 1139 (1974). -
Not to be foiled, CA 1 responded with a deft parry and a 
lightning thrust. Softly conceding that it erred in originally 
focusing on the structure of Maine law, the panel now took as a 
given that there is a single crime, "unlawful (felonious) homi-
cide." But CA 1 rejected the state's contention that since malice 
went not to criminality but rather to a level of blameworthiness 
this matter fell outside Winship. Going beyond the state's 
characterization of its malice presumption as procedural, CA 1 
looked to the substance of the di fferent consequences attaching 
to a defendant convicted of felonious homicide depending on the 
degree. The court focused principally on disparate sentences 
. ---- ----,. 
(nominal fine to seventeen years for manslaughter, life imprison-
ment for murder), and concluded that the Maine presumption was _ _____________________ .... 





a jury to drm,.r inferences from the evidence was not objectionable, 
even if in practical effect it may require a defendant to coille 
forward with evidence (Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837). 
Therefore, permissive infer ences, as contrasted with mandatory 
presumptions, remain unaffected by the CA 1 decision. 
CONTENTIONS: Maine contends that CA 1 erroneously extended 
Winship to reach factors bearing on mitigation of punishment 
and not on criminality. Interestingly, Maine does not advance 
the argument that the presumption, even if within the reach of 
Winship, is valid under this court's criminal statutory presumption 
'!:_/ 
cases. 
DISCUSSION: This issue is also before the Court in Burko v. 
Maryland, No. 73-6761, Summer List 6, page 3, in which a con-
viction was upheld despite a Winship challenge. The ultimate 
holding by CA 1, rejecting the mandatory presumption but reaffirm-
ing the propriety of permissive inferences, is narrow and within 
the reasoning of Winship although it does re_present an extension 
• ,I - ____ _) 
I o~ Winship bey on~ the _ fact [ s] neces".":~ o constitute the crime." 
397 U.S. 358, 364. Should the Court wish to decide this issue, 
the present case would be more suitable than Burko (which presents 





in post-Winship decisions have held similar presumptions unconstitu- 1 
- - - -
tional). 
9/10/74 Nannes Opn in Ptn App 
2/ Both USDC and CA 1 found that the presumption could not stand 
under Leary and Turner. 349 F.Supp. at 153-54; 473 F.2d at 947-48. 
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~ / IMMEDIATE SITUATION: 
Motion of Respondent 
for Leave to Proceed 
!:•,; Fg_rma P§:._~pE:!_riJ; and 
for the Appointment of Counsel 
\ . 
On October 15, the Court granted cert to CA 1 to 
review the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to resp. Resp now seeks an order 
permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis and appointing Peter J. Rubin, Esq. 
as counsel to represent him in this Court. 
CONTENTIONS OF RESP : Resp was incarcerated in 1966 pursuant to his con-
viction for murder. He was released on bail this past summer and became gainfully 
employed. His current net salary is $86 per week. Resp avers that he has no sav ing s 
account nor does he own any personal or real property of substantial value. 
- 2 -
.. Ir: \ 
Resp does not indicate the duration of Mr. Rubin1 s service to him as counsel. 
Mr. Rubin is a member of the Supreme Court bar. 
DISCUSSION: It may be noted that counsel's expenses in this case probably fall 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Joel Klein 
DATE: January 4, 1975 
No. 73-14 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
This case involves the constitutionality of requiring 
a defendant to prove that he acted in "the heat of passion" 
or "with provocation" in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. 
On its face Maine law is similar to the common law which 
distinguishes murder from manslaughter by the element of 
malice aforethought - i.e. a cruel and ~~~W\4) heart. 
Traditionally malice aforethought is negated by showing that 
a defendant acted in passion or upon provocation. 
The trial court in respondent's case instructed the 
jury that malice aforethought should be presumed from the 
commission of a voluntary homicide. The defendant was then 
required to negate malice by proving that he acted in the 
heat of passion or with provocation. The Maine Supreme 
Court held that malice aforethought was not a "fact" necessary 
to show murder but rather a description of those who commit 
such a crime. The court also held that manslaughter and murder 
were not different crimes but rather degrees of the same 
crime. Thus, requiring the defendant to prove passion or 
provocation only involved proof of a mitigating factor, not 
, an exculpatory factor and therefore Winship was inapplicable. 
2. 
The federal district court granted respondent's petition 
for habeas, holding that Winship required the state to prove 
malice aforethought since it was the distinguishing factor 
between murder and manslaughter. CAl affirmed, concluding, 
in the face of the Maine Supreme Court's decision, that under 
Maine law malice aforethought was essential to the crime of 
murder and that murder and manslaughter were two distinct 
crimes. This Court granted cert and remanded to CAl in light 
l),e,,~ 
of ~eftcfa:t'" intervening decisions of the Maine Supreme Court 
arguing that CAl should have considered itself bound by the 
Maine court's interpretation of Maine law. CAl then held 
that, even under the Maine Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the state's homicide law, Winship required the state to prove 
the lack of passion or provocation. 
1. Respondent again urges this Court to reject the 
Maine Supreme Court's interpretation of its own law. 
I can understand why he does so because the Maine Supreme 
Court has clearly run through some verbal gynmastics by 
reading malice aforethought out of its homicide statute in 
order to avoid Winship. Nevertheless I think this Court should 
make clear that Maine's interpretation of its substantive law* 
J 
*Some cases have suggested that a State interpretation of 
its procedural rules is not always binding. E.g., Boliie v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347. 
3. 
is controlling, even if it is irrational, unless that 
' '---
interpretation offends the Constitution. Although this 
would appear obvious, apparently the question has generated 
some confusion (certainly in CA 1), and this Court has 
failed to rule definitively on it. See Comment, Due Process 
and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The 
Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 Me. L. 
Rev. 37 (1974). This is an interesting area and in many 
ways the most important issue in the case. 
2 . Even assuming that Maine's interpretation of 
its law is controlling, the issue on the merits in this 
case is close. I think there are two potentially reasonable 
rationales for ~ ins ip, = both approaches are 
acceptable. My own preference, as I will explain, is for 
the second approach. 
A. The literal formula constitutionalized in 
Winship was proof of "every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime charged." One approach to implementation of this 
formula is to allow the state to define the elements of 
(or facts necessary to constitute) a crime. Such an approach 
mirrors, to some degree, the Court's analysis of due process 
entitlement cases. 
The sole limitation on the states under this 
approach would be a sort of substantive due process 
limitation as to what behavior it may designate as criminal. 
4. 
For exa1J1.ple, a st_ate ~obviously Anot say that all 
homicides are murder and therefore that all it need prove 
to satisfy the constitution is that the defendant killed 
~ y(.-
the victim. Cf. Mo~ssette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246. 
Similarly, I think at least an arguable due process question 
is presented by a statute eliminating the issue of insanity 
from the criminal law. 
In the present case I do not think that the due process 
clause would be offended if malice aforethought were excluded 
from the crime of murder or felonious homicide so long as a 
s· 
reasonable element of intent - such a Maine has - remains. 
A 
Thus, within these bounds, Maine would be free to define its 
criminal law and Winship would not apply to the burden of 
proof of passion or provocation since under state law these 
factors go only to mitigation of punishment. 
B. A second approach to Winship is to ignore the 
state's definition necessary to co stitu~e .J.._ 
1~ W~ 6_ i~ 1.Uh.e.tA .. 
a crime." factor is determ 
fact, manner, or duration of confinement it must be proved -
beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship, itself, is consistent 
with this approach since in that case the Court ignored New 
York law insofar as it defined delinquency as a non-crime. 
I prefer this approach because, without it, 6... 7 {,__-k__ 
by engaging in semantic gamesmanship, a 0tnt;e can frustrate 
the purpose of Winship. For example, first and second 
5. 
degree murder in most states are clearly degree s of the 
same crime, and under the Maine Supreme Court's rationale 
in this case, a state could say that a defendant must 
prove that he did not deliberate and premeditate in order 
to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder 
since all that is at issue is punishment. Similarly, under 
the approach of the Maine Supreme Court, if a state defines 
murder as a single crime but punishes it by death if the 
defendant acted with specific intent, but only by life 
imprisornnent if the defendant acted with a general intent, 
the state could require the defendant to prove that he acted 
only with a general intent. Again, under this approach, 
the state could define all assaults as a single offense 
with different degrees (and different punishments) depending 
on the defendant's intent - i.~., intent to kill, to connnit 
robbery, to connnit rape, etc. - and require the defendant 
to show that he had only an intent to assault and nothing 
more. 
Although these hypotheticals are perhaps a bit 
extreme I do not think that they are much different from 
trying to say that manslaughter and murder are the identical 
crime and the distinction between them goes only to the 
penalty. The distinction goes to intent and if intent is to 
6. 
remain a vital element of the criminal law, and in 
my view it should, then I think when the State requires 
a different intent for different crimes, different degrees 
of a crime, or different punishments, it should bear the 
burden of proof under Winship. 
3. 
J:~) 
Consistent with the approach ehp..rge there is 
a way to ease the burden on the state somewhat. If the 
~ 
lack of passion is an element of murder~the state must 
prove it in all cases, even when the defendant does not 
contest it. This can lead to some unnecessary effort. 
Thus, one accomodation would be to adopt the approach 
to the insanity defense in federal court: The defendant 
has the burden of raising and going forward on the insanity 
issue, but then the state must prove sanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469. 
In short, the burden of proof would always be an issue of 
constitutional dimension while the burden of going forward 
would not be such an issue. 
Upon rereading this memo, I find that it may be a bit 
cryptic. I would appreciate the opportunity to spell out my 
view if you have the time. 
J.K. 
7Ju..Wa.-r~ (~~ 
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January 20, 1975 
Re: Mullaney v. Wilbur - No. 74-13 
Dear Chief: 
At Conference Friday I voted to affirm in this case, 
announcing my disagreement with Harry's observation that 
we ought not to rest on the jury instruction. I have 
since had opportunity to reflect: and after reading what 
we said last Term in~ v. Naughten about taking jury 
instructions as a whole, I find myself now in agreement 
with Harry on this point. For me this change of heart 
brings me all the way over to the "reverse", column 




The Chief Justice 









:Mr. Joel Klein 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: February 24, 1975 
No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
I spent most of Sunday reviewing your draft of 2/20/75, 
with great interest. 
The draft is thorough, scholarly and - in my view -
sound. It was fascinating reading. 
As you will observe, my editorial changes are not 
substantive. 
I have only one reservation: Parts I and II seem too 
long, and occasionally a little repetitive. Yet, I did not 
have an opportunity to review the draft again with this 
thought in mind. Accordingly, I am not able to make a 
specific suggestion as to condensation or elimination. 
I appreciate that nruch of the problem in Part I derives from 
the "yo-yo" history of this case. Also, you expanded this 
part to meet my concern as to the possible confusion arising 
from the first drafto 
In any event, there is no rush to circulate this - as 
we have a week before the new assignments. Accordingly, 
take such time as you wish to edit and polish the opinion 
with the view to putting it in the best possible shape. 
In this process, bear in mind the appearance of over-length 
and some repetition. Also, you might ask David to make 
2. 
suggestions in this respect. 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:p:r.mtt <!):amt 4tf tlft ~t~ ~tai:tg 
~a,glpngfott, :!9. C!):. 2llffe'!, 
March 10, 1975 
No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 







Mr. Joel Klein 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DA'l'E: February 24, 1975 
No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
I spent most of Sunday reviewing your draft of 2/20/75, 
with great interest. 
The draft is thorough, scholarly and - in my view -
sound. It was fascinating reading. 
As you will observe, my editorial changes are not 
substantive. 
I have only one reservation: Parts I and II seem too 
long, and occasionally a little repetitive. Yet, I did not 
have an opportunity to review the draft again with this 
thought in mind. Accordingly, I am not 1a:N<e to make a 
specific suggestion as to condensation or elimination. 
I appreciate thatrJmU'C1!n of the problem in Part I derives from 
the "yo-yo" history of this case. Also, you expanded this 
part to meet my concern as to the possible confusion arising 
from the first draft. 
In any event, there is no rush to circulate this - as 
we have a week before the new assignments. Accordingly, 
take such time as you wish to edit and polish the opinion 
with the view to putting it in the best possible shape. 
In this process, bear in mind the appearance of over-length 
and some repetition. Also, you might ask David to make 
,l . . ' 
,,· ,. 
2. 
suggestions in this respect. 
Congratulations on a fine piece of work. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Joel Klein 
DATE: April 10, 1975 
Here are the points that I would rely on in distinguishing 
Leland from Mullaney: 
1. The historical development regarding heat of passion 
has clearly been toward rejecting the original York case which 
required the defendant to prove this element. At present only 
about six states place this burden on the defendant. In 
contrast, there has been no such historical development with 
regard to the insanity defense. Indeed fully half the states 
place the burden on the defendant. 
2. The Winship interests of stigma, and ·most important, 
liberty, are affected far differently in an insanity case. 
The stigma attaching to one found not guilty by reason of 
insanity may be as great as that attaching to a person 
convicted for the charged offense. Moreover, the deprivation 
of liberty, in practical terms, resulting from a not guilty 
by reason of insanity verdict may be far greater than the 
deprivation of liberty resulting from conviction. See this 
Court' s opinion in Lynch v. 0 \1-eA ~ 
3. Requiring the prosecution to negate heat of passion 
is not a unique burden since that element is an objective 
element of intent, traditionally proved by adducing testimony 
.. . -
2. 
regarding the factual circumstances of a homicide. An 
insanity plea, by contrast, uniquely turns on the defendant's 
subjective state of mind. Indeed, without the defendant's 
cooperation it is often difficult if not impossible for the 
state to rebut a plea of insanity. 
J.K. 
ss 
Supreme Court of the United State.s 
Memorandum 
______ JumL.6 ___________________ , 197-5 ___ _ 
MISS SMITH 
Sally-- This is the one I spoke 
to you about yesterday. Since the 
lineup form differs from the one 
sent to me you might wish to check 
with the Justice to make certain 
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MEMORANDUM TO PRI NT SHOP 
Re: Tentative Syllabus for: 
No. 74-13, Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Attached is a tentati ve syllabus for the above 
case, to be set up in page proof, four (4) copies of 
which are to be returned to me as soon as poss i ble. 
It is important that this matter be given priority so 
that no delay will ensue at such time as the opinion 
is ready for release. 
Should there be any subsequent changes in the draft 
syllabus, you will be advised. 
If the lineup o f Justices is not already included 
in the enclosed draft, the author of the opinion or I 
will send it to you for insertion directly below the 
syllabus. 
The final syllabus (wi th the decision dat e in-
serted and the lineup included) is to be stapled on 
top of the opini on and released for distribution with 
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MULLANEY v. WILBUR 
L------1 
I:. 
MULLANEY et al. v. WILBUR 
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit 
No. 74-13. Argued January 15, 1975--Decided 
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, 
which upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment, to prove that he acted in the heat of passion 
on sudden provocation in order to reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter, in which case the punishment is a fine or 
imprisonment not exceeding 20 years. Held: The Maine rule 
does not comport with the requirement of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
-.-, ~~ - - Lvh ,vi...., 
358~ -aHd to meet that requirement the prosecut0,,1: o:f a 
homicide case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
when the issue is properly presented. Pp. 8-20. 
496 F. 2d 1303, affirmed. 
., 









NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re- I 
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time I 
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion I lineup to Print Shop 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for d 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber when :1Vailablc an 
- Lineup included. 
- Lineup still to be 
added. Plea;;e send 
oo., 200 u.s. 321, 337. I a copy to me. 
~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ I 'fnot:;tz~~g::v aas0 fa:;f.;vfJ°ft of 
Syllabus 
MULLANEY ET AL. v. WILBUR 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOI1 
THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
No. 74-13. Argued January 15, 1975-Decided June 9, 1975 
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, which 
upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, 
to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden p~ovocatiori 
in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, in which case the 
punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years. 
1I eld: The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
358. To satisfy that requirement the prosecution in a homicid~ 
case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence 
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue 1s 
properly presented. Pp. 8-20. 
496 F. 2d 1303, affirmed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. REHN-
QUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. r, joined, 
? 
v show-
- Lineup, which has now 
been added. 
- Additional changes 
in sylbbus. 
HmrnY PUTZEL, jr. 
Reporter of Dcci;;ions. 
' - -·-·-•····'-•·•-----·--·--
lfp/ss 6/6/75 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
This case comes to us from the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. Petitioners are the State of Maine 
and the Maire State Prison Warden. Respondent was 
convicted of murder under a Maine procedure that placed 
the burden on him to prove that he had acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation. Only if he carried 
this burden could he reduce murder to manslaughter. 
After exhausting his state remedies, respondent 
filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court 
challenging the Maine procedure. 
For the reasons stated in our opinion, we hold that 
the challenged procedure is a denial of due process. We 
follow this Court's decision in In Re Winship which requires 
the prosecution in a criminal case to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist has filed a concurring opinion 
in which the Chief Justice has joined. 
June 10, 1975 
i,, \ 
Cases Held for No. 74-13 MULLANEY v. WILBUR 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
1. No. 73-6761 Burko v. Maryland. 
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. 
He seeks a writ of certiorari. His primary contention 
__ is that the trial court committed constitutional error 
when, over petitioner's objection, it instructed the 
jury pursuant to settled state law that 
If you should find that there was an 
unlawful homicide, then the burden rests 
upon the defendant not to satisfy you 
beyond a reasonable doubt but to a fair · 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
killing happened under certain circumstances 
[.!.e., without malice] to reduce the homicide 
' [from second degree murder] to mans laughter. 
It would appear that petitioner's claim is meritorious 
under Mullaney. Since it is difficult to ascertain the 
precise contours of Maryland homicide law, I would suggest 
vacating tha judgm.ent of the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals and remanding for further consideration in light 
of Mullaney. 
Petitioner also raises two additional claims: 
(1) that a Maryland statute providing that "(i]n the 










" . ,. ... 
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2. 
of Law, as well as of fact" is a denial of due process 
and equal protection; and (2) that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree 
murder. In my view neither of these issues merits review 
by us. 
2. No. 74-5632 Castro v. Regan. 
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. 
After exhausting state remedies he unsuccessfully sought 
federal habeas relief. His sole claim is that the court 
coamitted constitutional error in the following instruction: 
''The law presumes that all unlawful 
homicides, that is all unlawful killings, 
are committed with malice unless the lack 
of malice is affirmatively demonstrated by 
the evidence. 
"And so, since I've told you that the 
' legislature has divided the crime of murder 
into two degrees, that is first and second 
degree, we note again the presumption that 
every unlawful killing of a hum.an being is 
murder in the second degree." 
Respondent concedes that in vacuo this instruction 
might be considered erroneous. -ifut he argues that, taken 
as a whole, the instructions made clear that the prosecution 
was required to prove malice. Respondent points to the 
trial court's general instructions regarding the state's 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the de-
fendant's presum.ption of innocence. 
I am inclined to vacate and remand on the basis 
of Mullane1. Although the instruction in this case is an aberrat on in New Jersey>l am not pers,J&ded that the 
error was cured by the court's general instructions on 
the presumption of innocence and on the prosecution's 
general burden of proof by a reasonable doubt. 
, 
' 









3. No. 74-532 McKinney v. Alabama. 
Petitioner was convicted of selling obscene 
literature pursuant to a state statute that forbids 
the sale of material previously adjudged obscene in 
an equitable proceeding. Petitioner was not a party 
to the equitable proceeding at which the state 
established obscenity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Petitioner was then notified that the material he was 
selling specifically had been declared obscene, but 
he persisted in his sale nonetheless. At his trial the 
only issue for the jury was whether petitioner sold the 
material, not whether the material was in fact obscene. 
Petitioner claims that reliance on the prior equitable 
decree to establish obscenity violated his right to a 
jury trial, his right to confront his accusers and his 
due process right to have the state prove all facts 
necessary to constitute the crime by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected 
. these contentions by a 5-4 vote. 
I do not think Mullaney has a significant bearing 
on this case. One could suggest, as do the dissenters 
below, that by allowing a conviction based on a prior 
determination in which the state was only required to 
establish obscenity by a preponderance of the evidence 
allows for circumvention of Winship. But the court 
below considered the basic Winship claim and rejected 
it on the ground that the offense for which petitioner 
was convicted was selling material previously declared 
obscene and not selling obscene material. I doubt 
Mullaney adds anything to this specific question. 
The general issue presented by this case is whether, 
consistent with the First Amendment and general notions 
of due process, a state can predicate an obscenity 
conviction on a prior determination of obscenity at 
which the defendant was not a party and at which the 
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4. 
If the Court is interested in this issue the case should 
be granted, limited to Question 2 in the petition. (The 
remainder of the petition raises general Miller-type 
questions which we denied in companion cases, Nos. 74-536 
and 74-537). The issue is certainly not a frivolous one. 
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11las}rhtghtn. J. C!f. 211.;i~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 10, .1975 
Re: No. 74-13 -- Garrell S. Mullaney et al. v. 
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 





.§ttptmtt {!fau:rt llf flrt ~h .§udtg 
:.u!pngfou. ~- Qf. 2llffe~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. March l 0, 1975 
RE: No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree . 
Mr. Justice Powell 





~tmt (!fltttrl ltf tltt ~ttitt~ .itattg 
Jhudp:ngfott. ~. (If. 2Dffe~, 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
March 10, 1975 
Re: No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
I 
j,u;vrtmt (!Jcurt cf tqt ~ttittb j,tattg 
Jfa.slp:ttgtcn. ~. (!J. 2'llffeJl.$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 13, 1975 
Re: No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
;r~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
•~. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.prtntt C!fMtrt of tlrt 'Jnitt~ ,ifattg 
:.raslti:nght~ J. C!f. 2llffe"~ 
April 22, 1975 
PERSONAL 
Re: 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis: 
My "hangup" in this case arises out of the fact that inevitably it 
will operate to undermine Leland v. Oregon. The major vice that pro-
duced disaster for a number of years under the Durham rule in the 
CADC derived from the Davis cases in 1897 under which (in federal 
court) as soon as any evidence of mental disturbance appeared, the 
burden shifted to the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant had no mental disease. That imposed a functionally 
impossible burden to prove a negative, which as Earl Warren said in 
the Kennedy Assassination Report is a virtual impossibility. To prove 
a negative beyond reasonable doubt is a total impossibility. 
It is for this reason that Leland is a large factor in the whole 
enforcement of criminal law even though it rarely need be cited. An 
affirmative defense ought not be subject to a requirement that the 
prosecution negate it beyond a reasonable doubt. It simply can't be 
done. Only the good sense of juries has saved us from the consequences 
of a good deal of judicial folly, like Durham, in this area of proof burden. 
Even at that, hosts of plainly guilty got verdicts of not guilty by reason 
of insanity, and went to St. Elizabeth's for a few months and were out 
on the street again. 
You indicated that you intended no denigration of Leland. (That 
means you lack mens ~! So your "offense" can be only manslaughter 
of Leland but murder or manslaughter kills with equal finality ! I) 
The 11 defense" of insanity is, as of now at least, not a mitigating 
factor since it does not open the way for a verdict on a lesser included 
offense, but for an entirely non-criminal verdict. The prosecution 
should not rationally be required to negate that or any other 11 yes but11 
or affirmative defenses - - that is for the defendant who asserts the claim. 
- 2 -
If you really do not wish to "do in" the Leland rule, I'd like to 
discuss this further. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
April 23, 1975 ~ 
No. 74-13 !-t&llaney v. 
Dear Chief: --
Thank you for yours of April 22. · 
I was aware, in writing the above case, of the Leland 
problem. In view of divergent views among members of the 
Court, it seemed prudent to steer a middle course and avoid 
' reference to Leland. 
My own view is that Leland is distinguishable from 
Mullang. The historical development of the two lines of 
cases s been quite different. The State of Maine is one 
of the few states that has adhered to the original~ 
case (decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in 1845). Although initially followed, the trend for many 
years has been away from York. Indeed, Massachusetts itself 
has abandoned York, and I-ai'rnk only some half-dozen states 
continue to place on the defendant the burden of proving 
"heat of passion on sudden provocation". In contrast, there 
bas been no such historical development or trend with respect 
to the defense of insanity. Although I have not made a · 
"head count", bly understanding is that at least half of the 
states place the insanity burden on the defendant. 
.. Moreover, there are significant differences in the 
' nature of these two affirmative defenses. Requiring the 
prosecution to negate "heat of passion" will not normally 
be a difficult burden for the state to carry since that 
element is usually susceptible of proof from the circum-
stances of the homicide. For example, in Fowler (argued 
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- 2 -
absence of heat of passion (had the defense been raised) 
from the circumstances in which Fowler - long after his fight 
with Griffin - drove to Griffin's residence and gunned him 
down in the presence of his two small children. It would, 
however, have ·been more difficult for the state to carry the 
burden of proving Fowler's insanity. One's mental condition 
often is entirely sub~ective and also can be feigned. Indeed, 
without the defendants cooperation - e.g., submitting 
honestly to psychiatric examinations - it may be difficult 
if not impossible in some cases for the state to rebut a 
plea of insanity. I must say, however, that my observation 
has been that few juries pay much attention to an insanity 
defense. ,· 
In sum, I do not consider that my opinion in Mullaney 
forecloses a different decision if Leland should be 
reexamined by this Court. I tried to write Mullaney strictly 
in accord with the Conference vote which was, as I understood 




~UFmtt (!f"1trl .of tqt~a ~taftg 
,ras4tttghtn. ~. <!f. 2llffe'!, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 14, 1975 
PERSONAL 
Re: No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Lewis: 
I have not had a chance to discuss your April 23 response to 
my memorandum. I have not persuaded you that your opinion, as it 
stands, is the demise of Leland. I lived with this problem for 13 years 
and Leland 1s interaction with the Davis cases is the crucial factor. That 
we do not see this in the same light is suggested by your comment that 
11 £ew juries pay much attention to an insanity defense. 11 Possibly so in 
Virginia, but not everywhere, and surely not true at all in federal courts 
bound by Davis. If Leland goes, the Davis rule of burden of proof will 
be the law, and there is the risk that the D. C. Circuit 1 s nightmare with 
Durham could be repeated. Happily, Durham is dead, buried and un-
mourned, but literally dozens of cases each year went for defendants 
under it, and they were out of St. Elizabeth's after a brief sojourn - -
with few exceptions. 
I1d like to go over this with you and I wish, at this hard time 
of the year, I had the 11 gall" to ask you to read the attached. 
(/ Regards, 
~(3 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBE AS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ 1¥:m.t- <!f ourl of t!rt ~h ~htlts-
~,u; lying-f.ttn. ~. <q. 21Jffe.ll,~ 
June 5, 1975 
Re: 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Dear Bill: 
Please show me as joining your concurrence. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquis{)f1 rs 




June 5, 1975 
No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur 
Putzel: 
The line-up in the above case is as follows: 
Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court 
in which Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marsh.all and 
Blackmun, J.J., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring 
Mr. Henry Putzel, 
lfp/ss 
Mr. Cornio 
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Rticircul a t ed : 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74--13 
Garrell S. Mullaney 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit. 
[March -, 1975] 
MR . .TusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with 
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule com-
ports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re 
Winship, 397 U. S. 3.58, 364 (1970), that the prosecution 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged. 
I 
ln June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E. 
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him 
rested on his own pretrial statement and on cireumstan-
tial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude 
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's state-
ment, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had 
attacked Hebert m a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homo~ 
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but 
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respond-
ent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's 
counsel asserted that at most the homicide was ID!l,11- . 
'• 
' . 
,. ' . 
74-1:t--OPINtON 
MULLANEY v. WILBUR 
slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the 
heat of passion provoked by thP. homosexual assault. 
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine 
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder 
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not sub-
divided into different degrees. The common elements 
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither 
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionatz 
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are 
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between 
murder and manslaughter. 
In view of the evidence, the trial court drew particular 
attention to the difference between murder and man-
slaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of 
both offenses," the court charged that malice aforethought 
"was an essential and indispensable element of the crime 
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide 
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed,. 
1 Ai:, examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court men-
tioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and 
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38. 
2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the· 
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he 
mtended an act which was calculated and should have been under-
stood by a person of reason to be one likely to do great bodily harm 
and that death resulted." App., at 37. 
3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651,. 
provides: 
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought 
either express or implied is guilty of murder and i:,hall pe punished 
by imprisonment for life." 
The manslaughter statute, Tit . 17, § '..S51, in relevant part 
provides . 
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of pas,;ion, 
on imdden provocation, without express or implied malice afore-
thought . . . shall be punished by 11 fine of not more than $1,000 
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however, that if the prosecution established that the 
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice 
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the 
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion. 4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought 
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsist-
ent things," App., at 62; thus; by proving the latter the 
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. The court then con-
cluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of 
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 0 
After retiring to consider its verdict, 
returned to request further instruction. 
the jury twice 
It first sought 
4 The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore-
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby 
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which 
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mis-
chief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruct:on, the court repeat-
edly made clear that expres1:1 malice need not be established since 
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted 
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice 
appears to have been wholly unnece~ary, as the Maine Supreme 
.Tudicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1972). See also n. 10, infra. 
, "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the act the 
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might 
[make] ordinary men of fair, average dispositiim liable to act irra-
tionally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion 
rather than judgment." App., at 47. 
8 "Heat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation .. 
Sudden means happening without previous notiee or with very brief 
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . It 
is not every provocation, it is not. every rage of passion that wilt 
reduce a killing from murder to manslaught<>r. The provocation 
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing, 
that, for a moment a person could be-that for a moment the 
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own 
1.tndersianding." App., at 47, 
4, 
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reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice afore-
thought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion." 
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found 
respondent guilty of murder. 
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, arguing that he had been denied due proces~ be-
cause he was required to n0gate the element of malice 
aforethought by proviug that he had acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that 
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential 
element of the crjme of µrnrder-indeed that it was the 
sole element distinguis~ing murder from manslaughter. 
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's de-
cision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the 
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Maine Judicial Court rejected this contention,1 
holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not 
distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the single 
generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 
278 A. 2d 139 (1971). The court further stated 
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that 
the prosecution could rest on the presumption of implied 
malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove 
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With 
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's 
trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the appli-
cation of the Winship pri~ciple to a "reductive factorn 
1 Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions a,t trial. 
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable 
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d, 
at 144. 
8 The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be 
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, however, that Win..-
ship should be 11:1ven complete retroactive effect , Ivan v. City of 
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such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id., 
at 146. 
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus ln federal district court. Wilbur v. Rob-
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled 
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter 
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a 
single offense. The court further held that "[m] alice 
aforethought is made the distinguishing el~ment of the 
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an 
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153. 
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the 
prosecution to prove maliQe aforethought beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied 
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he 
acted m the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fitst Circuit affirmed, 
subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis 
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that "within 
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its 
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally 
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion 
of constitutional due process is a federal matter.'' Id., at 
!'14,:,;. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought 
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that 
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
( 1973), m which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's 
view that it was entitled to make an independent deter-
mination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed 
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are pun-
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cide. Accordingly, if the presecution proves a felonious 
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in 
order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for 
manslaughter.11 
ln view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari 
in this case and remanded to the Court of Ap-
peals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139· ( 1974). On 
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to 
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju-
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the 
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence 
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
resulted in significant differences in the penalties and 
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the 
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in 
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose-
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
again granted certiorari. 419 U. S. (1974). We now 
affirm. 
II 
We reject at t.he outset respondent's position that we 
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial 
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur-
1J The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to the view of the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circmt, malice aforethought connote:; 
no 8Ubstantive fact (such as pr<'meditation), but rather is solely a 
pohcy presumptiou. Under its rnterpretatiou of state law, the Marne 
court would require proof of the same elemen1 of mtent for bot,h 
murder and manslaughter, the distmction beiug that m the latter 
ca:se the intent results from a sudden provocation which lead:; the 
defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-671 
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der and manslaughter are distinct 9rimes in Maine, and 
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former 
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state 
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it 
marks a radical departure from prior law,1° leads to in-
ternally inconsistent . results, and is a transparent effort 
to circumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly 
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of 
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memp~is, 87 U. S. 590 
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and 
that we are bound by their constructions except in ex-
treme circumstances riot present here. 11 Accordingly, 
10 Respondent relies on Boyie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 
(1964). In that case, a State Supretpe Court's reinterpretation of 
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "u.nforesee.able" imd there-
fore deprived the defendant;, of fair notice of the tJossible criminality 
of _their acts at the time they were committed. Thu;;, the retroactive 
application of the new interpretation was it~elf a denial of due 
process. See also BrinA:erhoff-Faris 'Prust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 
U. S. 6n ( 1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes, 
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to 
respondent. since in Maine the burden .of proving heat of passion 
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See, 
e. g., State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78, 90--91 (18.54). To be sure, the 
trial court instructed the jury on the concept of expre..,,s malice 
aforethought, Hee n. 4, wpm, a concept, that was subsequently 
stripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. But, 
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need 
not, be ~hown since malice would be implied from t,he unlawful homi-
cide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. 
Nau.ghte11., 414 U. S. 141, l49 (1974), we di:;cern no prejudice to 
re:;pondent . · 
11 On rare occasions the Court has re-examined a state court inter~ 
pretation of state law when it appeur:; to be an "obvious subterfuge 
to evade consideration of u federal issue." Radio St1ttior,. WOW v. 
John1sun, 326 U. S. 120, lW (1945). See Ward v. Love Co., 253 
tr. R. 17 (1920); Terre l-Ja,ute & Ill. R.R. v. lndia.na ex rel. Ketchmn, 
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's 
construction of state homicide law, 
ITI 
The Maine la\, of homicide, as it bears 011 this case, 
can be stated succwctly: Abst>nt ,1ustification or excuse, 
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious 
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as rnurdet-
i. e., by life imprisonment-uuless the defendant -proves 
by a fair preponderance of the evide11ce that it was com-
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, 
in wluch case it is punished as mans]aughter-f. e., by 
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule 
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due 
process. 
A 
Our ana]ysis may be illuminated 1f this issue is placed 
in historical coutext. 12 At early common law only those 
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were 
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and 
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the sever-
ity of the common-Jaw punishment for homicide abated. 
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justi-
fiable homicides expanded to include, for example, acci-
dental homicides and thost> committed in self-defense. 
of ::;tate law, ev1•11 a~,;ummg it to be novel, doe:, not fn1,;trate cou-
,n<lnation of 1 hP due proep::;:,; i~8UP, a~ the Mmne court it~Plf recog-
nized, State v. Wilbur. 2i~ A. :M, at 14U, and as the remam<ler of 
llw, op1111011 mak<.,, elt>ar. S<'<> geuerally Comment. Due Proce::;rs ,11111 
~upremacy as Foundation:< for thP Adequacy Rule: The Remain:, of 
Ft·derali,;m \fter Wilbw· \". Wullcmey. 2!i Me. L. Rev :37 (1974) . 
1~ \Tuch of tlui,- lu;;tor;\ w:1~ :wt out m thl' Court's opm1on in 
\1cGautJw v. California. 402 P S. lH:3 ,. Ul7-198 (1971). See al,;o 
;{ St<'phen, A Hi~tory of .the Cnmmal Law of E:11gland 1-108 (1~83);; 
2 Pollock t\;: 1laitland, Hi~torv of Engli~h Law 478-487 (1895}. 
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Concurreutly, tµe widespread use of capital punishment 
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi-
ble for "benefit of clergy,"· a procedural device that 
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris-
diction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who com-
initted an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he 
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and 
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th 
century, English ruler~, concerned with the accretion of 
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, 
enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of 
clergy in all cases, of "murder of malice prepensed." 18 
Homicides that were committed without such malice 
were designated "manslaughter" and their perpetrators 
rentained eligible for the .benefit of clergy. 
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for 
all secular · offenses the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter 
(when voluntary) 14 arises from the sudden heat of pas-
sions, murder from the wickedness of heart." 4 Black-
stone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was 
designated as the element that distinguished the two 
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be 
implu•d by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent 
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden 
and sufficient violent provocation," the homicide waf:l 
13 12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496,; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen, 
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547) . 
14 Black:,.tone also referred to a class of homocides called involun-
tary manslaughter. Such hom1c1des were committed by accident in 
the t·our~e ot perpetrating another unlawful, although not feloniou~, 
,act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 191-192. This offense, with 
somP modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in 




MULLANEY v. WILBUR 
"presumed to be malicious." u Id., at 199, 201. In view 
of this presumption, the early English authorities, relying 
on the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB 
1727), held that once the prosecution proved an unlawful 
homicide, it was "incumbent on the prisoner to make 
out ... all ... circumstances of justification, excuse or 
alleviation ... to the satisfa~ti,on of the court and jury." 
4 Blackstone's Commentaries 201. See Foster, Crown 
Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of 
proving heat of passion on sudden provocation appears 
to have rested on the accused.16 
In this country the concept of malice a~orethought 
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it 
came to signify a substantive ~lement of intent, in the 
nature of express malice aforethought, requiring the 
prosecution to prove that the defendant intended. to kill 
or to inflict great bodily harm; in other j uri:;;dic tions it 
remained a policy presumption, identical to the con-
cept of :implied malice aforethought, indicating only that 
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed 
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See 8tate v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally 
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforetlllOught 
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden prnvoca--
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect, 
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally· 
Note, The Con8titutioqality of the Common Law Pr(!sumpti on of 
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986---999 (1974) . 
16 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: Burden of Persuasion 
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 808, 904---907 (1968), a:rgues 
that the reliance on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerb1i' the-
jury returned a special vndict making specific findings of fact. No· 
finding was made with respect to provocation. Absent 'such a rind-
ing the court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher main--
tams that in the context of a special verdict it it> impossible to de-
termine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his bmden of g1, ing 
forward with "some evidence" or the t1ltimate burden of persuading; 
the jury. Cf. n. 31, infra;, 
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Perkins: A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 
Yal'e L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).11 In a land-
mark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93 
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the defendant was re-
quired to negate malice aforethought by proving that he 
acted in the heat of passion.18 Initially, York was adopted 
in several other jurisdictions,10 including Maine.20 In 
1895, however, in the cont~xt of deciding a question of 
federal criminal procedure, this Court explicitly consid-
ered and unanimously rejected the general approach artic-
ulated in York. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469.21 
17 Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees, 
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and 
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in 
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsyl-
vania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 
Col. L. Rev. 701, 707-709 (1937). Maine initially adopted the dis-
tinction between degrees of murder, requiring proof of express malice 
to establish first-degree murder and considering implied malice to be 
sufficient for second-degree murder. See State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 
(1854); State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564, 575 (1870) (opinion of 
Kent, J .) . The State subsequently discarded the different degrees of 
murder, and provided that either expressed or implied malice afore-
thought sufficed to establish murder. See, e. g., State v. Merry, 
8 A. 2d 143 (1939). 
18 Justice Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth 
wall required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, in-
cluding malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate 
the suggestion that · the killing occured in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. He also rejected t he doctrine of implied 
malice on the ground that " [n]o malice can be inferred from the 
mere act of 'killing.' Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and 
unfom:ded." 50 Mass., at 128 , 
i1J See cases cited m Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79. 
20 State v. Knight , 43 Me. 11 (1854). 
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined 
to apply the specific holding of Davis---"that the prosecution must 
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And, in the past half century, the large majority of States 
have abandoned York and now require the prosecution to 
prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & 
A. Austin, Criminal Law 539-540 (1972).z2 
This historical review establishes two important points. 
First, the fact at issue here--the presence or absence of 
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, 
almost from the inception of the common law of homi-
cide, the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; H. Packer, 
The Limits of the Criminal SanP-tion 138-139 (1968). 
B 
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the 
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations 
Winship should not be extended to the present case. 
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the 
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact 
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide 
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis 
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to pe-
titioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were es-
sential to establish criminality in the first instance 
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play 
until the jury already has determined that the defendant 
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. 
22 See also State v. Cnevas, 480 P . 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Winship 
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a 
reasonable doubt). England also now requires the prosecution to 
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap. 
Cas 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap" 
Cas 462. 
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In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's 
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of 
paramount concern. since, irrespective of the presence or 
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he 
is likely to .lose his liberty and certain to be stigma-
tized. 28 In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those 
facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the 
defendant 
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law 
of Maine, li]_{e that of other jurisdictions, is concerned 
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also 
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has 
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion 
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Be-
cause the former are les~ "blameworthy," State v. Laf-
ferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 ( concurring opinion), they 
are subject to distinctly less severe penalties. By 
drawing this distinction, while refusing to :require the 
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable. doubt the 
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests 
found critical in TVinship. 
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail-
ing simply because a determination may already have 
28 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 196 (1973), petitioners seek 
to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence or ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the 
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the 
tmditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not sub-
ject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker·, 
404 U.S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our de-
cision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies, 
Undel Maine law, the Jury 1s given no discretion as to the sentell.CQ 
to be imposed on one found ~uilty of felonious homicide. If the· 
drfendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence re-
sults. On the other hand, if the jury finds him guilty only of maw-
,:;laughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise of its 
discretion to llllllose a sentence within the statutorily defined limits. 
14 
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been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and 
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal 
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences result-
ing from a verdict of murder, as compared wi~h a verdict 
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when 
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions 
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the dis-
tinction established by Maine between murder and man:. 
slaughter may be of greater importance than the differ-
ence between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes. 
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that 
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could 
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to 
proteot without effecting any substantive change in its 
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements 
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as fac-
tors that bear only on the extent of punishment. An ex-
treme example of this approach can be fashioned from the 
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single ge-
neric offense of felonious homicide into three distinct pun-
ishment categories-murder, vo].untarymanslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. O:rily the ·first two of these 
categories require that the homicidal act either be inten-
tional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See 
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670--671 ( concurring opin-
ion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not. 
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide. 
Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only 
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if peti-
tioners' argument were a,ccepted, Maine could impose a. 
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that 
traditionally might be considered involuntary man-
sl:.iughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his· 
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless. 2• 
21 Many States impose different statutory sentences on different. 
degreES of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition 
~:: .. ,( 
i, ,1\=>-
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Winship is concerned with substance rather than this 
kind of fonnalism. 26 The rationale of that case requires 
an 1:1,nalysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the 
law as applied and enforced by the state," St. Louis S. W. 
R. Co. ex rel. Norwood v. Arka~qs, 235 U. S. 350, 362 
( 1914), and to the interests of both the State and the 
defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of 
proof. 
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal inter-
ests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26 
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procequre 
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may 
lose his liberty upon conviction and bec~use of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction. 
o. 
"Moreover, use of the reasonab1e-doubt standard 
is ind'ispen~able to co.rnm&nd. the respect and confi-
dence of the cemmllnity in appPications of the crim-
inal law. It is critiear that the moral force of the 
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults 
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the· 
elements of aggravation-e. g,, intent to kill or intent to rob. 
But, see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d' 523' (Me. 1969) (prosecution 
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt) . 
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of 
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency· 
was not formally considered ;.. "crime" under state law. 397 U. S,. 
at 365-366; id ., at 368 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
2.11 See also Lego v ... Tworney,. 404 lL. S .. 47:7., 486i (.19'Z2) ~ 
16 
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that leaves. people in doubt whether innocent men 
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364. 
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this 
case than they were in Wiriship itself. Petitioner there 
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible 
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397 
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differen-
tial in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a man-
datory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant 
and the community's confidence in the administration of 
the criminal law are also of grea~er consequence in this 
case,27 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in 
Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide 
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treat-
ment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting). 
Not only are the interests underlying Winship impli-
cated to a greater degree in this case, but the protection 
afforded those interests is less here than it was in Win-
ship. There the ultimate burden of persuasion rema,ined 
with the prosecution, although the standard had been re--
duced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. In doing· 
so, Maine has increased further the likelihood of an er-
roneous murder conviction. Such a result directly cou--
travenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall; 
357 u. s. 513, 525--526 (1958): 
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his lib-
erty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by· 
~7 See Duncan v. Loui.suma, 391 U. S. 154, 160 (1968): 
The penalty authoriz<'d by the Jaw of thr locality may be taken 
'as a gauge of its social and ethiral Judgments ' " Quoting District,;, 
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the process of placing on the [prosecution] the 
burden ... of persuading the factfinder .... " 
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring), 
C 
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145, 
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument 
that th·~ homicide was committed in the heat of passion 
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend-
~nt. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prose-
cution to satisfy. The same may be said of the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many con-
troverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra-
ditional burden which our system of criminal justice 
deems essential. 
Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself ac-
knowledged that most States require the prosecution to 
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.28 Moreover, the diffi-
culty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in 
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective 
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that 
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation 1s similar to proving any other element of 
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
homicide. And although intent is typically considered 
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, 
218 See p. 12, supra. See also Note, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1937) . 
Many States do reqmre the defendant to show that there is "some evi-
dence" indicating that he arted m the heat of passion before requir-
ing the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of 
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Austin, 
supra, at 539. Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that. 
requirement. Sre also n . 30, infra. 
18 
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this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify 
shifting the burden to him. Ser Tot v. United States, 
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5 
u. s. 6, 45 (1969). 
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique 
in our system of criminal jurisprudence.211 Maine itself 
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. }1Iillet, 
273 A. 2d 504 ( 1971). "0 Satisfying this burden imposes 
an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to 
the burden involved in negating the heat of passio11 on 
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hat·d-
ship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the 
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical 
to criminal culpability.31 
21< Ser grnerally F. Wharton, A Trratise on the Law of Evidence 
§ 320 (1894); Model Penal Code § 1.13, Commcn1t at HO (Tent, 
Draf1 No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 883 & n. 14. 
1" In Millet the Mame Suprrme .Judicial Cou:-t adopted the "ma-
jority rnle" regarding proof of 1:,elf-defemm. 'fh0 burden of pro-
ducing "some evidence" on tin~ is1:,ue re1:,t;; with the drfendant, but 
the ultimate burde.n of per8uas10n by proof beyond a reaHonable 
doubt remains 011 the prosecution. 
a, This concl11s1on is supported by consideration of a relatPd lin~ of 
ca:<e~. Traditionally, the burden of proof is divided into a burden 
of i;oing forward with some evidence and au ultimatr burden of 
prr~ua:-non. Sre, "· g., McCormick, Evidence § 336 (2d ed. 1072). 
ln this opinion we havr dealt only w1tl1 the burden of persuasion. 
In ,·r11n111al ca,<{'~ generally thr proserntion bears both burdens. 
ln "ome 111:,;tanc~:-;. howl'wr, the pro,,;ecutiou is aided by a pre:,;ump-
tiou, 1<Pe Davis v. United States_, HiO lJ. S. 4tl9 (1895) (presumption 
of •lJJit~ ) , or a pnm1osil,le inference, :<ee United States v. Gainey, 
J~O {j. 8. G;i ( 19fi5) (inf Prt'nce of knowledge from J>re:,;ence at an 
.ill('gal ~t,11). St'e al1:,o Barnes \ U ntted .States, 412 lJ. S. 8:{i, 846 n. 
H (l~i;J l. Fsl' of the8c proePdnral device~ is subject to due procesS< 
lirmtations precisdy because tlwy requm· (in the case of a pre--
smnption) or permit (in the ca't' of a11 inference) the trier of fact 
,Cl couchuk that thr pro:-ecutiou ha::: nwt itK burden of proof with 
J. 
"fr', .. 
. .. . 
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:rn 
Maine la"' requires a defendant to establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder 
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defend-
ant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indi-
cates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a sig-
nificantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result 
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is 
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as 
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser 
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 
( concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Uue 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented 
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is 
Affirmed, 
re~p(•ct to the pre~umed or inferred fact Ly having satisfactorily 
cbtahli~hed other fo ct~. 
In each of these cases, the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof 
bPyond a reasonable doubt remained on the prosecution. See, e. g., 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 645 n. 9; Davis v. United States, 
160 U. S., at 484-488. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the de-, 
fendant obviously place~ nn rven greater strain upon him since he 
no longer need only raise a reasonable doubt with respect to the fact 
at ,~sue ; he mus1 affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly, 
tlw Due Procf':,s Cfause demands more exacting standards before 
the State may requirr a d(-'fendnnt to bear this ultimate burden of 
persuasion . See gcm•rally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, A:l-
1:mmption~ and Dne ProceBs m Criminal Cases: A Theoretica.l Over~ 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with 
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule com-
ports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged. 
I 
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E. 
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him 
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstan-
tial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude 
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's state-
ment, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had 
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homo-
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but 
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respond-
ent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's 
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the 
heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault. 
The trial com-t instructed the jury that Maine 
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder 
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not sub-
divided into different degrees. The common elements 
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither 
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionat2 
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are 
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between 
murder and manslaughter. 
In view of the evidence, the trial court drew particular 
attention to the difference between murder and man-
slaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of 
both offenses,3 the court charged that "malice aforethought 
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime 
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide 
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed, 
1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court men-
tioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and 
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38. 
2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the 
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he 
intended an act which wa;; calculated and should have been under-
stood by [a] person of rPa:::on to be> one likely to do great bodily harm 
and that death resulted." App., at 37. 
3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651, 
provides: 
"Whoever unlawfulJ:v kills a human being with malice aforethought, 
Pither express or implied, it; guilty of murdrr and shall be punished 
by imprisonment for life " 
The man~lau~htcr ~tatute, Tit. li § 2551, in rrlevant part 
provide~: 
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion., 
on sudden provocat1on, without exprc:,s or implied malice afore. 
thought . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000. 
or by 1mprisonm1-'11t for not more than 20 years . . • . " ' 
7 4-13-0PINION 
MULLANEY v. WILBUR 3 
however, that if the prosecution established that the 
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice 
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the 
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion.4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought 
and heat of passion 0~1 sudden provocation are inconsist~ 
ent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the 
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. The court then con-
_cluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of 
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 0 
After retiring to consider its verdict, 
returned to request further instruction. 
the jury twice 
It first sought 
4 The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore-
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby 
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of hurru1n life which 
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fa.tally bent on mis-
chief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruction, the court repeat-
edly made clear that express malice need not be established since 
.malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted 
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice 
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. La,fferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(Hl73). See also n. 10, infra 
5 "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the a ct the 
rrason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might 
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irra-
tiomilly without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion 
rather than judgment." App., at 47. 
6 "[HJ eat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation. 
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief 
notice ; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . . It 
is not every provocation, it is not every rage of passion that will 
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation 
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing, 
that for a moment a person could be-that for a moment th~ 
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own 
1 
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reinstruction on the doctrine· of implied malice afore~ 
thought, and later .on the definition of "heat of passion." 
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found 
respondent guilty of murder. 
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process be-
cause he was required to negate the element of malice 
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that 
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential 
element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the 
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. 
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's de-
cision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the 
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Maine Judicial Court rejected this contention,1 
holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not 
distinct crimes but rather different degrees 0f the single 
generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 
278 A. 2d 139 ( 1971). The court further stated 
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that 
the prosecution could rest on the presumption of implied 
malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove 
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With 
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's 
trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the appli-
cation of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor" 
'1 Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial. 
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable 
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d, 
at 144. 
8 The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be 
applied rc-troactively. We subsequently deci<,led, however, that Win,-
ship should be given complete ret,roactive effect. Ivan v. City of 
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such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id., 
at 144--146. 
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Rob-
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled 
that under the Maine sta.tutes murder and manslaughter 
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a 
single offense. The court further held that "[m] alice 
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the 
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an 
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153. 
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the 
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied 
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he 
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 
subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis 
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that "within 
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its 
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally 
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion 
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at 
945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought 
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that 
Wtnship requires the prosecution to prove this fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's 
view that it was entitled to make an independent deter-
minat,ion of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed 
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are pun-
ishment categories of the si~1gle offense of felonious homi-
' ' ' ,. 
6 
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious 
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in 
order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for 
manslaughter .9 
In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari 
in this case and remanded to the Court of Ap-
peals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139 (1974). On 
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to 
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju-
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the 
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence 
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
resulted in significant differences in the penalties and 
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the 
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in 
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose-
cution must prove beyond a reasonable donbt that the 
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now 
affirm. 
II 
We reject at the outset respondent's position that we 
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial 
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur-
1l The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to t,lie view of the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforethought connotes 
no subshmtive fact (such as premeditation), but rather is solely a 
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine 
court would require proof oi the ::;ame element of intent for· both 
murder and mam;laughter, the distinction being that in the latter 
case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the 
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and 
that malice aforethought is a fact essenti&l to the former 
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state 
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it 
marks a radical departure from prior law,10 leads to in-
ternally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort 
to drcumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly 
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of 
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 590 
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and 
that we are bound by their constructions except in ex-
treme circumstances not present here.11 Accordingly, 
10 Re:,;pondcnt relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 
(1964). In that case, a State Supreme Court'8 reinterpretation of 
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and there-
fore deprived the defendants of fair notice of the possible criminality 
of thrir acts at the time they were committed. Tlms, the retroactive 
application of the new interpretation was itself a denial of due 
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes, 
Rf'::1pondrnt'::; Brief, at 12, there was no comparablr prejudice to 
respondent, since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion 
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See, 
e (I., State v. Knight, 43 Mr. 11 1:37-13R (1857). To be stm, the 
trial court instructf'd the jury on the concept of express malice 
·1foretho11ght, see n. 4, supra, a concept that was subsequently 
stripped of its vitality by th<.> Maine Supreme Judirial Court. But 
the trial court explicitly stated that exprcs::1 malice aforrthought need 
not be shown ,;ince maJice would be implied from the unlawful homi~ 
cidc. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. 
Naughten, 41411. S. 141,149 (Hlia), we dio('cm no prej udice lo 
r<·~pon<lent. 
11 On rare occa8ion8 the Court has re-examined a ~tate court inter• 
prctahon of state law when it appear:,; to be an "obvious subterfuge 
1 o evade consideration of a frderal i:s~m· ." Radio 8tation WOW, Inc . 
v Johnson , :3213 U. S. 120 129 (1945). See Word 1. Love Co., 253 U.S. 
17 (1920); Terre llaute ,~ ind. R. R . 1· . Indiana ex rrl. Ketchum, 
11)4 r, S. 579 (1904). In tln:;. ea,;,e, the J\lainr rc,urt's i11terpretntl01i 
0 
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's 
construction of state homicide law. 
III 
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case, 
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse, 
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious 
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder-
i. e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was com~ 
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, 
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by 
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule 
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due 
process. 
A 
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed 
in historical context.12 At early common law only those 
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were 
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and 
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the sever• 
ity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated. 
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justi• 
fiable homicides expanded to include, for example, acci-
dental homicides and those committed in self-defense, 
; 
of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate con-
sideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recog-
nized, State v. Wilbur, 2i8 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of 
this opinion make,; clear. See genemlly Comment., Due Process and 
Supremacy H::i Foundation,; for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of 
Federalism After "Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974). 
12 Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971). See also 
:3 Stephen, A Hi.;tory of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883); 






MULLANEY v. WILBUR 9 
Concurrently, the widespread use of capital punishment 
was ameliorated further by l:lxtension of the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi-
ble for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that 
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris-
diction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who com-
mitted an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he 
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb bral)ded and 
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th 
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of 
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, 
enacted a sei'ies of statutes eliminating the benefit of 
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 18 
Homicides that were committed without such malice 
were designated "manslaughter" and their perpetrators 
remained eligible for the benefit of clergy. 
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for 
all secular offenses the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter 
(when voluntary) 11 arises from the sudden heat of pas-
sions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Black-
stone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was 
designated as the element that distinguished the two 
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be 
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent 
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden 
and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide was 
13 12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496) ; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512) ; 23 Hen. 
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531) ; 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547) . 
11 Blacbtone also referred to a clas,, of homicides called involun ... 
t ary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in 
the course of perpetrating another unlawful , although not felonious, 
.act. 4 Blackstone's Commenta n es 192-193. This offense, with 
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized m 
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"presumed to be malicious." 1 " Id., at 201. In view of 
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying 
011 the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB 
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the 
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent / 
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of 
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction 
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at com-
mon law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden 
provoca.tion appears to have rested on the defendant.16 
In this country the concept of malice aforethought 
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it 
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring ~ 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to 
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions 
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that ~ 
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed 
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me. 1972). See generally 
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought 
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provoca. 
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect, 
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally 
Note, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of 
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986-999 (1974). 
16 Fletcher, Two Kings of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of 
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Ca~es, 77 Yale L . .J. 880, 
904-~07 (1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance 
on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerby the jury returned a 
special verdict making specific findings of fact. No finding was 
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the 
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains 
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deter. 
mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of going 
forward with "some evidence" or the ultimate burden of persuading 
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).11 In a land-
mark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) .93 
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the defendant was re-
quired to negate malice aforethought by proving by a pre- , 
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of 
passion.18 Initially, Yark was adopted in several other 
jurisdictions,10 including Maine. 20 In 1895, however, in 
u Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees, 
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and 
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in 
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsyl-
vania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 JJ_ A __ 
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937). a::.e.K£l..o... 
18 Justice Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth 
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, in-
cluding malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate 
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. He also rejected the doctrine of implied 
malice on the ground that "[n] o malice can be inferred from the 
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and 
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128. 
19 See casf'S cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79. Some 
confusion developed, however, as to precisely what Yor~ re4uired. 
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof" 
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular 
bsue and a burden of persuading the fact finder with respect to that 
issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or bj· 
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evi-
denre § 336 (2d ed. 1972). This d1stinrhon apparently was not 
well recognized at the time York was decided, and thus in some' 
jurisdict10ns it was unclear whether the defendant was required to 
bear the product10n burden or the persuasion burden on the 1s;:;ue 
of the heat of pas~ion . See, e. (J ., cases discussed in People v. Morrin , 
31 l\.lieh . App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971). 
Indeed, 10 years !.fter the decision in York, Chief Justice Shaw 
explained that "the doctrine of York's cm;e was that where the kill-
ing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing 
[Footnote 20 i,~ on p. 12] \ 
12 
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal pro~ 
cedure., this Court explicitly considered and unanimously 
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis 
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469.21 And, in the past half 
century, the la.r~e majority of States have abandoned 
York and now require the prosecution to prove the ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond 
a reasonable doubt. See La:Fave & Austin, Criminal Law 
539-540 (1972). 22 
This historical review establishes two important points . 
. First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of 
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, 
fu,rther is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious 
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69 
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) ( emphasis in original). He further noted 
that thi8 presumption did not govern when there was evidence 
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion. 
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satis-
fied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with 
malice, they will retnrn a verdict of murder; otherwise they will find 
the defendant guilty of m,rnslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even 
the author of York quickly limited its scope to require only that 
the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is, 
that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other 
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by 
requiring the defendant to prove "to the satisfaction of the jury" 
that he aC' ted in the heat of pasEion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63 
N. C. 26 (1868). 
20 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1.857) . 
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined 
to apply the specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must 
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt--to the States. 
22 See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Winship 
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a 
reasonable doubt). England also now requires the prosecution to, 
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt . Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap. 
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions., 1935 Ap .. 
Cas. 462. 
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almost from the inception of the common law of homi-
cide, the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; Packer, 
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968) . 
B 
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the 
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations 
Winship should not be extended to the present case. 
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the 
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact 
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide 
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis 
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to pe-
titioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were es-
sential to establish criminality in the first instance 
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play 
until the jury already has determined that the defendant 
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. 
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's 
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of 
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or 
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he 
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigma-
tized. n In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those 
28 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). and 
McGuutha v California, 402 U. S. 183, 196 (1971), petitwners seek 
to buttress this contention by argumg that smce the presence or ab-
sence of the heat of passion on i,;udden provoration affect,; only the 
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the 
trachtional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not sub-
ject to rtgorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker, 
404 ll . S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our de 
cision toda,· and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bod1e1:=. 
14 
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facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the 
defendant 
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law 
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned 
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also 
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has: 
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion 
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Be-
cause the former are less "blameworth[y]," State v. Laf-
ferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they 
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By 
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the 
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests 
found critical in ·winship. 
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail-
ing simply because a determination may already have, 
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and 
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal 
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences result-
ing from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict 
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when 
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions 
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the dis-
tinction established by Maine between murder and man-
slaughter may be of greater importance than the differ-
ence between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes. 
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that 
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could 
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to• 
Under Maine law, thr jury is given no discretion as to the sentence. 
to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the· 
defendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence re-
sults. On the other hand, if the jury finds him guilty only of man-
slaughter it rc.mains for the trial court in the exercise of its 
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protect without effecting any substantive change in its 
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements 
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as fac-
tors that bear only on the extent of punishment. An ex-
treme example of this approach can be fashioned from the 
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single ge-
neric offense of felonious homicide into three distinct pun-
ishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these 
categories require that the homicidal act either be inten-
tional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See 
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opin-
ion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not 
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide. 
Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only 
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if peti-
tioners' argument were accepted, Maine C'ould impose a 
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that 
traditionally might be considered involuntary man-
slaughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his 
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.24 
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this 
kind of formalism. 25 The rationale of that case requires 
an analysis that looks to the "operatic,m and effect of the 
law as &,pplied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W 
24 Many States impose differer..t statutory sentences on different 
degrees of assault . If Winship were limited to a State 's definition 
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults 
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the 
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob. 
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d .523 (Me. 1969) (prosecution 
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of 
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency· 
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S.,, 
at 3.6.5-366 ; id.., at 373-374 (Harlan, J ., concurring), .. 
16 
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R Co. v. ArkansM, 235 U. S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the 
interests of both the State and the defendant as affected 
by the allocation of the burden of proof. 
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal inter-
ests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 20 
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure 
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may 
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction. 
"Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard 
is indispensable to command the respect and confi-
dence of the community in applications of the crim-
inal law. It is critical that the moral force of the 
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men 
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364. 
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this 
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there 
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible 
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397 
U S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differen-
tial in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a man-
datory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant 
and the community's confidence in the administration of 
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this 
case,21 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in 
26 See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972). 
27 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 160 (1968): 
"The penalty authorized by the law of thr loeality may be taken 
'as a gauge of its social and ethical ,iudgmen1 s.'" Quoting District 
of Cot¥mbia ,. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) . 
·. 
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Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide 
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treat-
ment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting) . 
Not only are the interests underlying Winship impli-
cated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect·/ 
the protection afforded thor:ie interests is less here. In 
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained 
with the prosecution, although the standard had been re-
duced to proqf by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result, I 
where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact 
in dispute, is to increase further the likelihood of an 
erroneous murder conviction. Such a result directly con-
travenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall, 
357 u. s. 513, 525-526 (1958): 
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his lib-
erty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the 
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the c~ C> 
clusion of the trial. ... " 
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) . 
C 
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145, 
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument 
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion 
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend-
ant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prose-
cution to satisfy. The same may be said of the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many con-
troverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra-
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself ac-
knowledged that most States require the prosecution to 
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.zs Moreover, the diffi-
culty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in 
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective 
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v. 
Roll'ins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that 
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation is similar to proving any other element of 
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
homicide. And although intent is typically considered 
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, 
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify 
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States, 
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5 
u. s. 6, 45 (1969). 
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique 
in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 21) Maine itself 
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet, 
273 A. 2d 504 (1971).30 Satisfying this burden imposes 
28 See p, 12, supra. Sep ::ilso ote, 38 Mo. L. Rei·. 105 (1973). 
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evi-
dence" indicating that he acted 111 the heat of passion before requir-
ing the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of 
pa~sion beyond a reasonable doubt. SE'e LaFavr & Austin, supra, 
at 539; Prrkins, supra, n. 14, at 50-51. Sec also nn. 16 & 19, snpra . 
. Tothmg in this opinion i~ intended to affect thai rrquirement. See 
abo n. 30, infra. 
20 See generally Wharton , A Tm.1fo,e on thr Law of Evidence § 320 
(9th Ed. 1884) , Model PPnnl Code § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, S'Upra, n 16, at 883 & n. 14. 
so In Millet the Maine Supreme ,Judicial Court adopted the "ma-
jority rult•" rrgnrcling proof of :self-defen~e. The burden of pro-
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a,n obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to 
the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique '.1ard-
ship on the prosecution that would justify requirh.g the 
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical 
to criminal culpability.31 
:I£" 
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pas~ 
the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt remains on the prosecution. 
31 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of 
cases. Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the 
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instauces, 
howevrr, it is aidrd by a presumption, see Davis v. United States, 
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (prt'snmption of sanity), or a permissible 
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 6:3 (1965) (inference 
of knowledge from presence i,t an illegal still). Thes('. procednrnl 
device1, require (in the casr of :1 presumption) or permii (in the case 
of a11 inferencr) the trier of fact to concludr that the prosrrution 
has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred 
fact by having satisfactorily established other foe:ts . Thus, in effect 
thry rPquire the dl'fendant to presen1 somr evidence contesting the 
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. Unit<>d State/$, 
412 U. S. 837, 846 n. 11 (197a) . Since they shift the production 
burclrn to thC' defendant, these devicf's must satisfy crrtain dur 
prorrs:,; n•quirrments. See e. g., Barnes v. United States, S'll]Jra; 
Turner v. United ,States, 390 U. S. :398 ( 1970). 
In each of these cases, howtwer, thr ultimatr burden of per~uasinn 
by proof beyond a reasonablP rioub1 remained on the prosecution. 
Se<', e. !7 -, Barnes v. United 8tate8, 412 U.S., al 845 11. 9; Davi1J v. 
United 8tates, 160 U.S .. :1t 484-488. Shifting the burden of prrwa:,;iorr 
to the d<'f Pndant obviously place~ an l'VP!l grratcr strain upon him since f 
lrn no longer need nnly pre~cn1 ~orne rvidence with respect to the fact 
at i:,;suc; he must affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly, 
the Due l'roccss Clause demands more exacting standards before 
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of 
persuasion. Sefl generall.y Ashford & Risinger, Presumptionf-1, As~ 
smnptions and Due Process in Criminal Ca&es: A Theoretical Over .. 
view, 79 Yale L. J.165 (1909), 
" ' .. 
•. 
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder 
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defend-
ant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indi-
cates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a sig-
nificantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result 
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is 
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as 
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser 
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 
(concurring opinion) . We therefore hold that the Due 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented 
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is 
Affirmed. 
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The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with 
murder' to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule com-
ports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re 
Winship, 397 U. S, 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged, 
I 
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E, 
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him 
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstan-
tial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude 
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's state-
ment, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had 
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homo-
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but 
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respond ... 
ent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's 
counsel asserted that at most the homicide was man-
·; 
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the 
heat of passion pr-0voked by the homosexual assault. 
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine 
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder 
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not sub-
divided into different degrees. The common elements 
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither 
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionatz 
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are 
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between 
murder and manslaughter. 
In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular 
attention to the difference between murder and man-
slaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of 
both offenses/ the court charged that "malice aforethought 
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime 
of murder," App., at 40, withput which the homicide 
would be manslaughter. 1'he jury was further instructed, 
1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court men-
tioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and 
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38. 
2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the 
jury lo find "either that the defendant intended death, or tl1at he 
intended an act which was calculated and should have been under. 
stood by [a] person of reason to bP one likely to do great bodily harm 
and that death resulted." App., at 37. 
3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651, 
provides: 
"Whoever unlaw£ully kills a human being with malice aforethought, 
either express or implied, is guilty of mmcler and shall be punished 
hy imprisonment for life." 
The manslaughter statute, Tit. 17, § 2551, in relevant part 
provides: 
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, 
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice afore-
thought " " . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 
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however, that if the prosecution establi-shed that the 
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice 
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the 
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion! The court emphasized that "malice aforethought 
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsist-
ent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the 
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. The court then con-
cluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of 
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 6 
After retiring to consider its verdict, 
returned to request further instruction. 
the jury twice 
It first sought 
4 The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore~ 
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby 
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which 
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fa.tally bent on mis-
chief." App., at 40, 41. Despite thil;l instruction, the court repeat-
edly made clear that express malice need not be established since 
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted 
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice 
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1973). See also n. 10, infra. 
5 "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the act the 
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might 
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irra,., 
tionally without due delibe·t·ation or reflection, and from passion 
rather than judgment." App., at 47. 
0 "[H]eat of pa~sion will not av'.lil unless upon sudden provocation. 
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief 
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for ... , It 
is not every provocation, it is not, every rage of passion t11at will 
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation 
must be of such a char.acter and so close upon the act of killing, 
that for a moment a person could be-that for a mornent the 
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own 
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reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice afore-
thought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion." 
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found 
respondent guilty of murder. 
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process be-
cause he was required to negate the element of malice 
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that 
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential 
element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the 
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. 
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's de~ 
cision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the 
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this con ten .. 
tion,7 holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are 
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the sin .. 
gle generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 
278 A. 2d 139 (1971). The court further stated 
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that 
the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied 
malice J:\,forethought and require the defendant to prove 
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo .. 
cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With 
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's 
trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the appli-
cation of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor 0 
' Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial. 
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable 
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d, 
at 144. 
8 The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be 
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, howeve,r, tbat -Win.-
ship should be given complete retroactive effect. Ivan v. Cit11 pf 
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!Uch as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id., 
at 144-146. 
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Rol>o 
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The :District Court ruled 
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter 
are distinct offenses, not di:ftetent degrees of a 
single offense. 1,he court further held that "[m]alice 
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the 
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an 
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id,, at 153. 
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires thff 
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a res. 
so nab le doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied 
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he 
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 
The Court of Appeale for the First Circuit affirmed, 
subscribing in general to the District Court's 11nalysi$ 
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. M1.tllaney, 
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Ahhough recognizing that "within 
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its 
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally 
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion 
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at 
945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought 
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that 
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's 
view that it was entitled to make an independent deter ... 
mination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed 
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are pun-
ishment c~te_gories of the ~i11~Je offeijse of fejonioQ~ ho~ 
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a feloniouf! 
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove thllJt 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in 
order to reGeive the lesser penalty prescribed for 
manslaughter.9 
In view of the Laf!erty decision we granted certiorari 
in this case and remanded to the Court of Ap., 
peals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139· (1974). On 
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to 
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju. 
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the 
''substance" of that law, the court found that the presence 
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
results in significant differences in the penalties and 
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the 
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in 
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose .. 
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now 
affirm. 
II 
'\Ye reject at the outset respondent's position that we 
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial 
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur .. 
9 The Maine court emphasized that, contra.ry to the view of th, 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforeth0ught connotes 
n:> substantive fact (such as premeditation), but rather is solely :,. 
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine 
court would require proof of the same element of intent for both 
murder and manslaughter, the distinction being that in the latter 
ease the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the 
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and 
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former 
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state 
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it 
marks a radical departure from prior law,10 leads to in .. 
ternally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort 
to circumvent Winship, This Court, however, repeatedly 
has held that state cour~s are the ultimate expositors of 
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U, S. 590 
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and 
that we are bound by their constructions e:,ccept in ex~ 
treme circum~tarices not present here.11 Accordingly, 
10 Respondent relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 
(1964). In that case a State Supreme Court's reinterpretation of 
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and there~ 
fore deprived the defendants of fair potice of the possible criminality 
of their acts at the time they were cotnmitted. Thus, the retroactive 
application of the new interpretation "as it~elf a denial of due 
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v, HiU, 281 
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes, 
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to 
respondent since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion 
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See, 
e. g., State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11; 137-138 (1857). To be sure, the 
trbl court instructed the jury on the concept of express malice 
aforethought, see n. 4, 3Upra, a concept tliat, was subsequently 
i;tripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme ,Judicial Court. But 
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need 
not be shown since malice would be implied from the unlawful homi .. 
cide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. 
Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973), we discern no prejudice to 
respondent. 
11 On rare occasions the Court has re-exo,mined :,. stnte court int.er .. 
pretation of state law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge 
to evade ronsideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, ]11£. 
v. Joh1'1,6on, 326 U.S. 120, 129 ( 1945) . See Ward v. Love Co., 253 U. B. 
17 (1920); Terre Haute & Ind. R. R. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketchum,, 
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's 
construction of state homicide law. 
III 
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case, 
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse, 
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious 
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder-
i, e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was com., 
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, 
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by 
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule 
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due 
process. 
~ 
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue fa placed 
in historical context.u At early common law only those 
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were 
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and 
were punished by death, Gradually, however, the sever-
ity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated. 
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justi-
fiable homicides expanded to include, for example, acci-
deptal homicides and those committed in self-defense, 
of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate eon., 
sideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recog-
nized, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of 
this opinion makes clear. See generally Comment, Due Process and 
Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of 
Federalism After Wilbur v, Mullaney, ~6 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974), 
n Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971). See also 
3 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883); 
2 PoJlock & Maitland, History of English Law 478-487 (2g ed. 1909). 
,I 
' . 
MULLANEY v. WILBUR 
Concurrently, the widespread 4se of capital punishment 
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi-
ble for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that 
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris-, 
diction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who com-
mitted an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he 
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and 
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th 
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of 
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, 
enacted a series of stat'utes eliminating the benefit of 
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 11 
U11lawful homicides that were committed without such 
malice were designated "manslaughter" and their per .. 
petrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy. 
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for 
all secular offenses the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter 
(when voluntary)u arises from the sudden heat of pas .. 
sions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Black-
stone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was 
designated as the element that distinguished the two 
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be 
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent 
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden 
and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide WR$ 
18 12 Hen. VII, C 7 (1496); 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen,. 
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547). 
u Blackstone also referred to a clas;, of homicides called involun., 
tary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in 
the course of perpetrating another unlawful, although not felonious, 
act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 192-193. This offense, wi~ 
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in 
ibis count~y. See Perkins On Cruninal Law 70-'77 (2d ed. 19\39) , 
10 
'14-13-OPINION 
MULLANEY v, WILBUR 
"presumed to be malicious." 15 Id., at 201. In view of 
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying 
Ori the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB 
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the 
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent 
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of 
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction 
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at com-
mon law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden 
provocation appears to have rested on the defendant.16 
In this country the concept of malice aforethought 
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it 
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to 
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions 
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that 
absent proof to the contrary a, homicide was presumed 
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally 
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought 
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provoca .. 
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect, 
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally 
Note, The Constitutiona.lity of the Common Law Presumption of 
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986-099 (1974). 
ir; Fletcher, Two Kinds of Ll?gal Rules: A Comparative Study of 
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880, 
904-907 (1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance· 
on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerby the jury returned a 
special verdict making specific findings of fact . No finding was 
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the 
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains 
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deterc• 
mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy 11is burdf'n <1f going 
forward with "some evid.ence" or the ultimate burden of persuagj;n,g; 
:the.jury. See al.son. 20, infr:.a. 
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).11 In a land-
mark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93 
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su= 
preme Judicial Court held that the defendant was re-
quired to negate malice aforethought by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of 
passion.18 Initially, York was adopted in Maine 10 as well 
as several other jurisdictions.20 In 1895, however, in 
:i7 Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees, 
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and 
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in 
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsyl-
vania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937). 
18 Justice Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth 
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, in~ 
eluding malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate 
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. He also rejected t11e doctrine of implied 
malice on the ground that "[n]o malice can oo inferred from the 
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and 
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128. 
19 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857). 
·20 See cases cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79. Some 
confusion developed, however, 1s to precisely what Y orlc required. 
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof" 
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular 
issue and a, burden of perstuiding the fact finder with respect to that 
issue by a standard such as proof beyond. a reasonable doubt or by 
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evi-
dence § 336 (2d <'d. 1972) . This distinction apparently was nt>t 
well recognized at the time York was decided, and thus in some 
jurisdictions it was 1mclear whether the defendant was required. to 
bear the production bnrden or the persuasion burden 011 the issue 
of heat of passion. See, e. g., cases discussed in People v. Morrin, 
31 Mich. App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971). 
Indeed, 10 years after the decision iu York, Chief Justice Shaw 
explained that "the doctrine of York's case was that where the ki11-
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal pro--
cedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously 
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Dav-is 
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469.21 And, in the past half 
century, the large majority of States have abandoned 
York and now require the prosecution to prove the ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond 
a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, Criminal Law 
530-540 ( 1972). 22 
This historical review establishes two important points. 
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of 
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, 
almost from the inception of the common law of homi-
further is shown, the prest:mption of law is that it was malicious 
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69 
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original). He further noted 
that this presumption did not govern when there was evidence 
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion. 
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satis-
fied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with 
malice, they will return a verdict of murder; otherwise they will find 
the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even 
the author of York quickly limited its scope to require only that 
the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is, 
that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other 
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by 
requiring the defendant to prove "to the satisfaction of the jury" 
that he acted in the heat of passion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63 
N. C. 26 (1868). 
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined 
to apply the, specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must 
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-to the State•• 
22 See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Win.~hip 
requires the prosecution to prove malir,e aforethought beyond a 
reasonable doubt) . England also now requires the prosecution to 
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap. 
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap~ 
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cide, the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 1G; Packer, 
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968) . 
B 
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the 
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations 
Winship should not be extended to the present case. 
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the 
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact 
necessary to constitut,e the crime" of felonious homicide 
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis 
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to pe-
titioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were es-
sential 'to establish criminality in the first instance 
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play 
until the jury already has determined that the defendant 
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. 
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's 
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of 
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or 
absence of the heat of pMsion on sudden provocation, he 
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigma-
tized. zs In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those 
28 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 1&1, 196 (1971), petitioners seek 
to buttress this contention by arguing that since the prC'sence or ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the 
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the 
traditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not sub• 
ject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker, 
404 U. S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our de-
cision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies, 
14 
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facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the 
defendant 
This anal,vsis fails to recognize that the criminal law 
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned 
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also 
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has 
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion 
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Be-
ca use the former are less "blameworth [y] ," State v. Laf-
ferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they 
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By 
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the 
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests 
found critical in Win.ship. 
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail-
ing simply because a determination may already have 
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and 
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal 
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences result-
ing from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict 
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when 
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions 
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the dis .. 
tinction established by Maine between murder and man .. 
slaughter may be of greater importance than the differ-
ence between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes. 
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that 
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could 
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to 
Und<'r .Maine law the jury is given no discretion aec to the sentence 
to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the 
defendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence re-
su1ts. On the other ud, if the jury finds him guilty only of man. 
slaughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise .of it& 
discretion to impose a sentence within the 1tatutorily defined limjt~, 
'14-13-0PINION 
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protect without effecting any substantive change in its 
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements 
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as f ac-
tors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An ex-
treme example of this approach can be fashioned from the 
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single ge-
neric offense of felonious homicide into three distinct pun-
ishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these 
categories require that the homicidal act either be inten-
tional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See 
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opin-
ion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not 
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide, 
See petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only 
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if peti-
tioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a 
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that 
traditionally might be considered involuntary man-
sla1.t6hter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his 
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.H 
Wins hip is concerned with substance rather than this 
kind of formalism.25 The rationale of that case requires 
an analysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the 
law as a,pplied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W 
24 Many States impose different statutory sentences on different 
degrees of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition 
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults 
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the 
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob. 
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d 523 (Me. 1969) (prosecution 
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt) . 
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of 
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency 
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S,. 
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R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362 ( 1914), and to the 
interest..c;; of both the State and the defendant as affected 
by the allocation of the burden of proof. 
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal inter-
ests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26 
61The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure 
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may 
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction. 
~'Moreover, use of the -reasonable-doubt standard 
is indispensable to command the respect and confi-
dence of the community in applications of the crim-
inal law. It is critical that the moral force of the 
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men 
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364. 
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this 
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner tp.ere 
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible 
extension of an additional four and one-half years, '397 
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differen-
tial in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a man-
datory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant 
and the community's confidence in the administration of 
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this: 
case/7 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in 
26 See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972). 
27 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S, 145, 160 (1968): 
"The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 
'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' " Quoting Di.~tricft 
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Winship was "benevolent'' in intention, seeking to provide 
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treat• 
ment." In re WinBhip, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting) . 
Not only are the interests underlying Winship impli-
cated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect 
the protection afforded those interests is less here. In 
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained 
with the prosecution, although the standard had been re-
duced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result, 
in a case such as this one where the defendant is required 
to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further 
the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such 
a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958): 
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his lib-
erty-th [ e] margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the 
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the con-
clusion of the trial. ... " 
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
C 
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145, 
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument 
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion 
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend-
ant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prose-
cution to satisfy. The same may be said of the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many con-
troverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra-, 
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself ac~ 
lmowledged that most States require the prosecution to 
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.is Moreover, the diffi-
culty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in 
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective 
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that 
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation is similar to proving any other element of 
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
homicide. And although intent is typically considered 
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, 
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify 
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States, 
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5 
u. s. 6, 45 (1969). 
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique 
in our system of criminal jurisprudence.211 Maine itself 
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self -
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet, 
273 A. 2d 504 (1971).~0 Satisfying this burden imposes 
:.s See p . 12, supra. See also Note, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1973) . 
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evi~ 
dence" indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requir~ 
ing the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of 
pai:;sion beyond a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, supra,,. 
at 539, Perkins, supra, n 14, at 50-51. See also nn. 16 & 20, supra. 
Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement . See 
also n. 30, infra. 
29 See genernlly Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence§ 320' 
{9th ed. 1884); Model Penal Cude § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent .. 
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, s,upra, n. 16, at 883 & n. 14. 
so In Millet the Maine Supreme Judicial. Courl adopted the "ma.~ 
jority rule" reg:uding proof of self-defense. The burden of pro~ 
d~cing ",some evidence" on this issue rest1< with the defendant, but 
·• 
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an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to 
the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hard-
ship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the 
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical 
to criminal culpability.31 
IV 
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pas-
the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt remains on the prosecution. 
31 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of 
cases, Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the 
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instances, 
however, it is aided by a presumption, see Davis v. United States, 
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity), or a permissible 
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 3~ U.S. 63 (1965) (inference 
of knowledge from presence at a'n ill~gal still). These procedural 
devices require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (iu the case 
of an inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution 
has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred 
fact by having satisfactorily established other frets. Thus, in effect 
they require the defendant to present some evidence contesting the 
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. United States, 
412 U. S. 837, 846 n. 11 (1973). Since they shift the production 
burden to the defendant, these devices must satisfy certain due 
process requirements. See e. g., Barnes v. United Stotcs, s1tpra; 
T1trne~ v. United States, :396 U. S. 398 (1970). 
In each of these cases, however , the ultnnnte burden of persuasion 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remained on the prosecution. 
See, e. g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 845 n. 9; Davis v. 
United States, 160 U. S., at 484-488. Shifting i he burden of persuasion 
to the defendant obviously places an even greater strain upon him since 
ho no longer need only present. some evidence with respect to the fact 
at issue; he must affirhiatively establish that fact. Accordingly, 
the Due Process Clause demands more exacting standards before 
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of 
persuasion. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Ase 
sumptions and Due Procesi; in Criminal CasEJs: A Theoretical Over~ 
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder 
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defend• 
ant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indi• 
cates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a sig• 
nificantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result 
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is 
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as 
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser 
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 
( concurring opinion) . We therefore hold that the Due 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation wheh the issue is properly presented 
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTrCE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration / 
or decision of this case. 
NOTE: Where It le feasible, a syllabus (headnote) wUl be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See Untted States v. Detrott Lumber 
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The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, which 
upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, 
to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
in order to reduce the homiride to manslaughter, in which case the 
punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years. 
Held: The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358. To satisfy that requirement the prosecution in a homicide 
case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence 
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is 
properly presented. Pp. 8-20. 
496 F. 2d 1303, affirmed. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. REHN-
QUIST, J., filed a, concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Garrell S. Mullaney 
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v. 
No. 74-13 
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit. 
,[June 9, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with 
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule com-
ports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re 
Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged. 
I 
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E. 
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him 
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstan-
tial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude 
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's state-
ment, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had 
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert 's homo. 
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but 
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respond-
ent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's 
®Unsel ass.erted that at most the h.omicide was man-
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the 
heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault. 
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine 
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder 
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not sub. 
divided into different degrees. The common elements 
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither 
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionati 
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are 
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between 
murder and manslaughter. 
In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular 
attention to the difference between murder and man-
slaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of 
both offenses,3 the court charged that "malice aforethought 
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime 
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide 
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed, 
1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court men• 
'tioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and 
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38. 
·2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the 
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he 
intended an act ,vhich was calculated and should have been under-
stood by [a] person of reason to be one likely to do great bodily harm 
and that death resulted:" App., at 37. 
a The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 265-1, 
provides: 
"Whoever unlawfully kills a ·human being with malice aforethought, 
either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished 
'by imprisonment for life:" 
The manslaughter statute, Tit. 17, § 2551, in relevant part 
provides: 
"Whoever unlawfully ·kills a ·human being in the heat of passion, 
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice afore,. 
· thought ... shall ·be punished ·by a fine of not more than $1,001) 
,or by imprisonment for -not mqre than -20 years . .• /' 
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however, that if the prosecution established that the 
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice 
aforethought Was to be conclusively implied unless the 
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion.4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought 
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsist-
ent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the 
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. The court then con-
cluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of 
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 6 
After retiring to consider its verdict, 
returned to request further instruction. 
the jury twice 
It first sought 
• The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore. 
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby 
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which 
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent. on mis• 
chief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruction, the court repeat-
edly made clear that express malice need not be established since 
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted 
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice 
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1973). See also n. 10, infra. 
5 "Heat of passion . .. me.ans that at the time of the act the 
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might 
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irra. 
tionally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion 
rather than judgment." App., at 47. 
0 "[H]eat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation. 
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief 
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . . It 
is not every provocation, it is not every rage of passion that will 
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation 
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing, 
that for a moment a person could be-that for a moment the 
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his ow9 
understanding." App., at 47-48. 
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Teinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice afore;. 
thought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion.'i 
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found 
respondent guilty of murder. 
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process be-
cause he was required to negate the element of malice 
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat 
' of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that 
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential 
' element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the 
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter, 
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's de-
cision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the 
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this conten-
tion,7 holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are 
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the sin .. 
gle generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 
'278 A. 2d 139 (1971) . The court further stated 
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that 
the prosecution could ·rest on a presumption of implied 
malice aforethoug11t and require the defendant to prove 
'that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo-
. cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With 
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's 
' · trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the appli-
' cation of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor" 
-r Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial. 
· The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable 
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d, 
at 144. 
8 The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be 
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, however, that Win. 
ship should be given complete retroactive effect. -Ivan v. City of 
-New :Yotk, 407 U. S. 203 (1972). 
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~uch as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id., 
at 144-146. 
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Rob; 
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled 
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter 
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a 
single offense. The court further held that "[m]alice 
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the 
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an 
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153. 
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the 
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a rea-
·sonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied 
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he 
itcted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 
The Court of Appea·1s for the First Circuit affirmed, 
subscribing in general to, the District Court's analysis 
and construction of Ma:lne law. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 
473 F. 2d 943 ( 1973). Although recognizing that "within 
·broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its 
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally 
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion 
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at 
'945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought 
with "premeditation," id., at '947, and concluded that 
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
'Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 
(1973), in which it sha1rply disputed the Fi:rst Circuit's 
•view that it was entitled to make an independent detere 
•mination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed 
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are pun-
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious 
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that 
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in 
order to receive · the lesser penalty prescribed for 
manslaughter .1' 
In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari 
in this case and remanded to the Court of Ap-
peals for reconsideration. ·414 U. S. 1139 (1974). On 
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to 
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju. 
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the 
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence 
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
results in significant differences in the penalties and 
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the 
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in 
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose• 
' cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now 
affirm. 
II 
We reject at the outset respondent's position that we 
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial 
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur• 
11 The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to the view of the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforethought connotes 
no substantive fact. (such as premeditation), but rather is solely a 
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine 
court would require proof of the same element of intent for botl.t 
murder and manslaughter, the distinction being that in the latte,r 
case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the 
defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-671 
·(concurring opinion). 
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and 
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former 
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state 
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it 
marks a radical departure from prior law,10 leads to in• 
ternally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort 
to circumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly 
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of 
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 590 
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and 
that we are bound by their constructions except in ex-
treme circumstances not present here.11 Accordingly, 
10 Respondent relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 
(1964). In that case a State Supreme Court's reinterpretation of 
a. criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and there-
fore deprived the defendants of fair notice of the possible criminality 
of their acts at the time they were committed. Thus, the retroactive 
application of the new interpretation was itself a denial of due 
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hil,l, 281 
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as 1'espondent apparently concedes, 
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to 
respondent since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion 
bas rested on the defendant for more than a century. See, 
e.g., State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 , 137-138 (1857). To be sure, the 
trial court instructed the jury on the concept of express malice 
aforethought, see n. 4, supra, a concept that was subsequently 
stripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. But 
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need 
not be shown since malice would be implied from the unlawful homi-
cide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. 
Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973), we discern no prejudice to 
respondent. 
11 On rare occasions the Court bas re-examined a state court inter-
pretation of state law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge 
to evade consideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, Inc. 
,v.Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 129 (1945) . See Wardv. Love Co., 253 U.S. 
17 (1920); Terre Ho:ute & Ind. R. R . v. Indiana ex rel. Ketchum:, 
194 U. S. 579 (1904). In this case the Maine court's interpretation 
8 
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's 
construction of state homicide law. 
III 
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case; 
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse, 
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious 
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder-
i. e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was com-
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, 
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by 
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule 
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat 
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due 
process. 
'A 
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed 
in historical context.12 At early common law only those 
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were 
,considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and 
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the sever-
ity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated. 
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justi-
fiable homicides expanded to include, for example, acci-
dental homicides and those committed in self-defense. 
of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate con-
sideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recog-
nized, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of 
this opinion makes dear. See generally Comment, Due Process and 
Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of 
Federalism After Wilbur v. Mull,finey, 26 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974) . 
12 Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971) . See also, 
3 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883); 
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 478-487 (2d ed. 1909). 
., 
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Concurrently, the widespread use of capital punishment 
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi-
ble for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that 
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris--
diction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who com-
mitted an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he 
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and 
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th 
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of 
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, 
enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of 
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 13 
Unlawful homicides that were committed without such 
malice were designated "manslaughter" and their per .. 
petrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy. 
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for 
·all secular offenses the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter 
(when voluntary) 14 mises 'liram ihe sudden heat of pas,., 
sions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Black-
stone's Commentaries Hm. Malice aforethought was 
designated as the relement that distinguished the two 
crimes, but it was 'recognized that such malice could be 
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent 
proof that 1tn ·unlawful 'homicide resulted from "sudden 
'and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide was 
is 12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496) ; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen. 
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 1(1"531); 11 Etlw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547). 
14 Blackstone also ,yeferrecl to a class of homicides called involun-
tary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in 
the course of perpetrating another unlawful, although not felonious, 
act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 192-193. This offense, with 
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in 
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"presumed to be malicious." 16 Id., a.t 201. In view o/ 
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying 
on the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB 
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the 
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent 
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of 
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction 
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentarie!!l 
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at com-
mon law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden 
provocation appears to have rested on the defendant.1 d 
In this country the concept of malice aforethought 
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it 
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to 
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions 
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that 
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed 
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally 
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought 
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provoca-
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect, 
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally 
Note, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of 
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. ilev. '973, '986-999 (1974). 
16 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of 
·Burden-of-Persuasion ·Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880, 
904-907 ( 1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance 
on Onerby's case was misplaced. fo Onerby the jury returned a 
special verdict making specific findings of fact. No finding was 
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the 
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains 
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deter-
·mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of going-
forward with "some evidence" or the ultimate burden of persuading: 
·the jury. See also n. 20, infra. 
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).n In a land-
tnark case, Commonwealth v. -York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93 
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the defendant was re-
quired to negate malice aforethought by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of 
passion.18 Initially, York was adopted in Maine 10 as well 
as several other jurisdictions.20 In 1895, however, in 
17 Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees, 
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and 
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation .in 
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsyl-
vania Statute Creating Degrees of 'Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937). 
18 Justice Wilde dissented, arguing that · the Commonwealth. 
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, in-
cluding malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate 
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. He also rejected the doctrine of implied 
malice on the ground that "[n]o malice can be inferred from the 
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and 
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128. 
19 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857). 
20 See cases cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79. Some 
confusion developed, however, as to precisely what Yor'c required. 
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof'' 
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular 
issue and a burden of persuading the fact finder with respect to that 
issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by 
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evi. 
dence § 336 (2d ed. 1972'). This distinction apparently was not 
well recognized at the time -York was decided, and thus in some 
jurisdictions it was unclear whether the defendant was required to 
·bear the production burden or t1ie persuasion burden on the issue 
of heat of passion. See, e. g., cases discussed in People v. Morrin, 
31 Mich. App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971). 
Indeed, 10 years after the decision in York, Chief Justice Shaw 
explained that "the doctrine of York's case was that where the kill-
·ing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing 
12 
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal pro-
cedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously 
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis 
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469.21 And, in the past halt 
century, the large majority of States have abandoned 
York and now require the prosecution to prove the ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond 
a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, Criminal Law 
539-540 (1972).22 . 
This historical review establishes two important points. 
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of 
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, 
almost from the inception of the common law of homi-
further is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious 
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69 
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original) . He further noted 
that this presumption did not govern when there was evidence 
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion. 
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satis-
fied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with 
-malice, they will return a verdict of murder ; otherwise they will find 
the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even 
the author of York quickly 'limited its scope to require only that 
·the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is, 
·that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other 
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by 
requiring the defendant to prove "to the sa.tisfaction of the jury'' 
that he acted in the 'heat of ·passion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63 
N. C. 26 (1868). 
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 190 (1952), the Court declined 
to apply the specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must 
·prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-to the States. 
22 See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 ('Hawaii 1971) (Winship 
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a 
't'easonable doubt). England also -now requires the prosecution to 
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a 
-reasonable doubt. Mancini v. 1Jir. of ·Public -Prosecutions, 1942 Ap. 
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap. 
1C~~2. . 
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cide, the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; Packer, 
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968). 
B 
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the 
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations 
Winship should not be extended to the present case. 
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the 
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact 
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide 
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis 
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to pe-
titioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were es-
sential to establish criminality in the first instance 
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play 
until the jury already has determined that the defendant 
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. 
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's 
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of 
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or 
absence of the heat of pa~sion on sudden provocation, he 
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigma-
tized. 23 In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those 
23 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 196 (1971), petitioners seelf; 
to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence or ab-
sence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the 
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the 
traditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not sub-
ject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker, 
404 U. S. 443 (1972). There is no incompatibility between our de-





facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate th~ 
defendant 
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law 
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned 
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also 
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has 
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion 
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Be .. 
cause the former are less "blameworth [y] ," State v. Laf-
ferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they 
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By 
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the 
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests 
found critical in Winship. 
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail., 
ing simply because a determination may already have 
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and 
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal 
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences result-
ing from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict 
,of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when 
viewed in terms of the potentia1 difference in restrictiong 
of personal liberty attendan-t to each conviction, the dis .. 
tinction established by Maine between murder and man-
slaughter may be of greater importance than the differ-
ence between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes. 
Moreover, if Winship were 1imited to those facts that 
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could 
undermine many of the inter€sts that decision sought to-
Under Maine law the jury :is given no discretion as to the sentence-
to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the 
defendant is found to ·be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence re-
sults. On the other ·hand, ,if the jury finds him guilty only of man-
slaughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise of its 
, discretion to impose a .sentence within the statutorily defined limi~ .. 
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protect without effecting any substantive change in its 
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements 
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as fac-
tors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An ex-
treme example of this approach can be fashioned from the 
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single ge-
neric offense of felonious homicide into three distinct pun-
ishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these 
categories require that the homicidal act either be inten-
tional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See 
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opin-
ion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not 
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide. 
See Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only 
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if peti-
tioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a 
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that 
traditionally might be considered involuntary man-
slaughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his 
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.26 
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this 
kind of formalism. 25 The rationale of that case requires 
an analysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the 
law as applied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W 
2• Many States impose different statutory sentences on different 
degrees of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition 
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults 
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the 
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob. 
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d 523 (Me. 1969) (prosecutio~ 
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
:u Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of 
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency 
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S • ., 
a.t 365-366; id., at 373-374 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
16 
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R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the 
interests of both the State and the defendant as affected 
by the allocation of the burden of proof. 
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal inter-
ests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26 
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure 
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may 
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction. 
"Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard 
is indispensable to command the respect and confi-
dence of the community in applications of the crim-
inal law. It is critical that the moral force of the 
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men 
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364. 
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this 
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there 
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible 
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397 
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differen• 
tial in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a man• 
datory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant 
and the community's confidence in the administration of 
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this: 
case,:n since the adjudication of delinquency involved in 
26 See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972) . 
27 See Duncan v. Louisiana., 391 U. S. 145, 160 (1968) : 
"The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 
'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' " Quoting District; 
of Columbia, v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 628 (1937) . . ,. 
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Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide 
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treat-
ment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting) . 
Not only are the interests underlying Winship impli-
cated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect 
the protection afforded those interests is less here. In 
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained 
with the prosecution, although the standard had been re-
duced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result, 
in a case such as this one where the defendant is required 
to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further 
the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such 
a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526 (1958) : 
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his lib-
erty-th[e] margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the 
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the con• 
clusion of the trial. . , ." 
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
C 
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145, 
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument 
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion 
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend. 
ant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prose• 
cution to satisfy. The same may be said of the require. 
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many con• 
troverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra. 
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itseti ac-
knowledged that most States require the prosecution to 
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.zs Moreover, the diffi-
culty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in 
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective 
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v. 
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that 
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation is similar to proving any other element of 
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
homicide. And although intent is typically considered 
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, 
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify 
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States, 
·319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395 
u. s. 6, 45 (1969). 
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique 
'in our system of criminal jurisprudence.211 Maine itself 
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self .. 
·defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet, 
273 A. 2d 504 (1971).80 Satisfying this burden imposes 
28 See p. 12, supia. See also Note, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1973). 
Many States do require tbe defendant to snow that there is "some evi .. 
dence" indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requir-
ing the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of 
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, supra, 
at 539; Perkins, supra, n. 14, at 50-51. See also nn. 16 & 20, supra. 
Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement. See 
, also n. 30, infra. 
29 See generally Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 320 
(9th ed. 1884); Model Penal Code § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 883 & n. 14. 
so In Millet t.he Maine Supreme Judicial Court adopted the "ma-
jority rule" regarding proof of self-defense. The burden of pro• 
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an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to 
the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hard-
ship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the 
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical 
to criminal culpability.31 
IV 
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a pre..-
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pas-
the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a. reasonable 
doubt remains on the prosecution. 
81 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of 
cases. Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the 
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instances, 
however, it is aided by a presumption, see Davi'8 v. United States, 
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity), or a permissible 
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (inference 
of knowledge from presence at an illegal still). These procedural 
devices require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (in the case 
of an inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution 
lias met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred 
fact by having satisfactorily established other facts. Thus, in effect 
they require the defendant to present some evidence contesting the 
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. United States, 
412 U. S. 837, 846 n. 11 (1973) . Since they shift the production 
burden to the defendant, tl1ese devices must satisfy certain due 
process requirements. See e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra; 
Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. '398 (1970). 
In each of these cases, however, tl1e ultimate burden of persuasion 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remaiued on the prosecution. 
See, e. g., Barnes, v. United States, 412 U. S., at 845 n. 9; Davis v. 
-United States, 160 U.S., at 484-488. Shifting the burden of persuasioo 
to the defendant obviously places an even greater strain upon him since· 
·he no longer need only present some evidence wit.h respect to the fact 
a.t issue; he must affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly, 
the Due Process Clause demands more exacting standards before 
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of 
·persuasion. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, As-
sumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases : A Theoretical Over-
view, 19 Yale L. J. 165 (1969) . 
20 
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder 
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defend-
ant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indi-
cates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a sig-
nificantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result 
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is 
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as 
a, murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser 
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 
( concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Due 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented 
in a, homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is 
Affirmed. 
